Unsettled Christianity

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February 13th, 2013

Thomas Aquinas on the Fast of #Lent

On the second head it is to be noted, that this “day of salvation” exhorts and invites us by eight ways to holiness…

…The ordination of the Church invites us all to confession, and fasting, and frequenting of the church; whence he who does not do these things breaks the precepts of Mother Church: Prov. 1:8, “Forsake not the law of thy Mother.” (Thomas Aquinas, vol. 3, Ninety-Nine Homilies of S. Thomas Aquinas Upon the Epistles and Gospels for Forty-Nine Sundays of the Christian Year ( trans. John M. Ashley;London: Church Press Company, 1867), 4.)

January 6th, 2012

Quote of the Day: Kent Dunnington @ivpress

Click to Order

A powerful argument that addiction is not a disease, nor immoral…

We are neither taught nor inclined to think of addicted persons as being actively and passionately engaged in the pursuit of the good life. We tend to think of them as persons who have checked out of the game or who are positively bent on destruction. But this is not so. I maintain that addictive behavior can tell us more than almost any other kind of human behavior about what human beings most deeply desire. (97)

This is a good book. Get it.

December 13th, 2011

Looking for Thomas: Aquinas’ Ethics in Today’s World

Thomas Aquinas depicted in stained glass

Image via Wikipedia

This is, um, rough draft of an ethics paper…

The great political ethicists of the Enlightenment Era have failed us. The great experiment of the American Democracy built upon Locke who in turn built upon Aquinas is near failure. It behooves us then to turn to either the new or the old to find new philosophies upon which to govern ourselves. The new is unproven and the old perhaps unfamiliar. It is not my hope to reestablish an ethical order on Thomas Aquinas but to look towards his natural philosophy so as to determine if, perhaps, his ethics are worth considering as a basis for forming a modern ethical platform from which to face the ever present dangers presented to us in the modern world. Thomas believed in a concept of the common good which the greatest philosophical minds have longed to achieve; however, if his ethics would not advance us towards it, they must be discarded.

To that end, this paper will be divided into two parts. The first will focus on the concept of the Common Good as found in Thomas Aquinas’ works. In this section, I will examine four areas which I feel contribute to understanding this concept. They are Law, Rights and Justice, War and Property. I will use the works of Thomas Aquinas as a primary source supported by ethicists who have wrestled with Thomas in their own works. Once this foundation is laid, I will examine Thomas’s concepts against the backdrop of several of today’s leading issues which the people of the United States are facing. The first issue will be a discussion on the civil rights of those who engage in homosexual acts[1] through the framework established in the previous discussions on Law and Rights and Justice. Following this, I will use Thomas’ Just War doctrines to discuss the developing international situation with Iran. Finally, I will draw from his words on the proper use of property in relation to the current Occupy movement in which the economic disparity is reduced to a slogan of the 99%. I will then make the conclusion on whether or not the ethics promoted by Thomas Aquinas would suffice in today’s reality.

It is impossible to seek a return to an ethical system which works without first determining why it is important to first seek it, especially on the corporate, or communal, level. The common, or civic, good is the driving goal for that which we will discuss. Decisions on Law and Justice and Rights as well as War are decisions which do not merely affect those whom the laws are meant for, those whose rights are violated, and those who will fight the wars. These decisions have an effect on the populace as a whole because in a democratic society, laws are promulgated by the elected body and enforced by monies received from the electing populace so that those laws and enforcement procedures which derive the minority of rights have a moral effect on the majority due to their passive participation. Property, when it becomes oppressive, rather, when it becomes a tool to abuse those without and to limit the advancement of society has an equal moral effect on the general society, and the more so when Property is centered in the hands of an oligarchical few.

In ST I-II 19, 10, Aquinas pulls together several commonalities which I will use to begin the conversation on the common good. The example is based on the execution of a criminal which allows Aquinas to examine domestic, civic, and even eternal good. How is a Civil Society supposed to judge the common good in a situation wherein a man will be executed leaving his family destitute? Thomas begins with the judge who must take care of justice, part of the common good, leading him to the order of execution. He writes that this has “an aspect of good in relation to the common welfare.” The wife is then considered who must of her own accord consider the “private domestic good” and in doing so, would have her will set against the execution. Following this, Aquinas considers the good of the universe “which is apprehended by God.” He notes that each will is good in and of itself. How then are we to determine what the common good is, on a more universal level, and then employ it when we, especially in a democratic society, have the pluralism of wills? Aquinas, I believe, would have us classify the wills into a hierarchy so that while the will of the wife is considered, the will of the people is paramount. Because of this, the execution must be carried forth. Of course, today, we may seek to employ arguments on the will of the person and how it might have been affected by nature and nurture and thus find a more suitable verdict, but nevertheless, the common good would be served by following the will of the Law because it is overly beneficial to the whole.

The Rule of Law is an important concept to many Western Democracies. For Aquinas, Law is divided into several parts, with the divine law being supreme. Along the way to divine law is human law, of which we are presently concerned. Thomas writes, “For human law’s purpose is the temporal tranquility of the state, a purpose which the law attains by coercively prohibiting external acts to the extent that those are evils which can disturb the state’s peaceful condition.” (ST I-II.17, 100, 2) He notes that a law is “a rule and measure of acts that induces person to act or refrain from acting.” (ST I-II.90) Simply, law belongs to reason. Laws, then, are meant to bring about the happiness as the “ultimate end of human life” being ordered to the common good. In the third article of Question 90, Aquinas, in discussing the competency of anyone’s reason in making laws, notes that since laws are ordered to the common good, then this ordering “belongs either to the whole people or to the person acting in the name of the whole people. And so lawmaking belongs either to the whole people or to a public personage who as the care of the whole people.” The point, then, is that laws are meant to bring tranquility to the State so that the common good is achieved, but that those whom the laws cover should be a part of the promulgation of such laws, especially, I would contend, in a democracy of some variation thereof, so that the laws so promulgated are beneficial to the whole.

The issue remains, then, as to what make illegal, or in some cases, what to legalize if something has been declared illegal from the start. Question 92 regards the effects on law. It is the second article of this question to which I turn. In this article, he provides two elements which will aid us as we discuss the issue of homosexual rights later in this paper. In the answer, Aquinas notes that as laws are dictates of reason and because of this basis in reason, demonstrative science can be used. Aquinas writes that this demonstrative science leads “us to assent to conclusions from certain first principles, so also reason leads us to assent to legal precepts from knowledge of certain things.” Laws are to be based on the demonstration of knowledge, not on mere beliefs and assumptions, because laws are based in reason. There is also, however, the agenda of the State. Wogaman draws from Aquinas,

This broad agenda for the state definitely includes, as far as possible, the suppression of vice and the inculcation of virtue among its people. But Thomas specifically disavows the effort to repress all vices. “Now human law,” he writes, “is framed for the multitude of human beings, the majority of whom are not perfect in virtue. Therefore human laws do not forbid all vices, from which the virtuous abstain, but only the more grievous vices from which it is possible for the majority to abstain; and chiefly those that are injurious other others, without the prohibition of which human society could not be maintained.[2]

To what end should laws be formed then? Laws, as Aquinas notes, are meant to protect against vicious vices and even permits morally indifferent acts which he defines as either “slightly good” or “slightly evil.” He calls for proportioned laws, quoting St. Isidore in saying, “laws should be framed for the common benefit of citizens, not for any private benefit.” Thomas notes that the political community consists of all sorts of people and it is these things which the law should regard[3]. He even allows that some laws will be directed to the part, but need to benefit the whole. This is where the goal of permitting some vices by not making them illegal must come into play. As Aquinas writes, “human law does not prohibit every kind of vice… rather, human law prohibits only the more serious kinds of vice, from which most persons can abstain, and especially those vices that inflict harm upon others.” He lists murders and thefts in this category. It is those actions which harm others which are to be suppressed. Finally, as to a point to be discussed later, Aquinas notes that the “fear of punishment is what law makes use of to induce obedience, and we in this respect posit punishment as an effect of law.” To sum up the law, it is first based on reason. Since it is based on reason, the use of demonstrable knowledge should be used to create laws. Finally, laws are meant to suppress not all vices, but the most vicious ones, which are those vices which allow one person to inflict harm upon another, while allowing for morally indifferent ones.

Justice is that which occurs after a right has been denied; they belong together because one necessitates the other. If law is the ordering of a State or society to the common good, rights then must be included in the end result, in the very common good. Aquinas, in Question 57, Article 1, writes that the “object of justice” is “to direct human beings in their relations with one another.” Further, he notes that justice “signifies a certain equality.” A right, then, as Aquinas defines it, is a thing which signifies the very things that are just. Humans have a right to justice in divine law and no less human law. For Thomas, however, there are two rights, natural and positive. Natural right is defined by those things which happen naturally, perhaps life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness whereas a positive right involves agreement between two parties, such as governmental arrangement between the governor and the governed. Further, Aquinas would add, “right or natural justice consists of things equated or commensurate with other things.” The Natural Right, and then Divine Right, is the area of concern at the moment.

Aquinas writes, “what is natural for things having an immutable nature needs to be always and everywhere such. But the nature of human beings is mutable. And so what is natural for human beings can sometimes be wanting.” In other words, human nature is not always the preferred nature of acting, so laws must be installed to insure a just equity between members of the society. Thomas uses the example of the enemy of the society who, once deprived of his weapons, wants them back. It is in the nature of the madman to want them back, but it is in the equitable just nature of the society to keep such a person from retrieving his weapons which have already been used to inflict harm upon the society. This type of right and justice is easily known in a society. What is not so easily known is the issue of the Divine Right. Aquinas writes, “We call decrees promulgated by God divine right. And divine right indeed partially concerns things just by nature, although their justice is unknown to human beings, and partially concerns things just by divine institution.” Again, I would return to the previous statements by Aquinas to that of laws based on demonstrative science in regards to divine institution. God as Creator instituted divine right before the foundation of the world, and at times, human nature conflicts with divine right so as to mask God’s just equity. If this is so, then perhaps moderation is due in a society which is still discovering things based on reason.

I want to turn a moment to the idea of natural right, or justice, in which Aquinas as continually called for equity. In the third article of the Question mentioned above, Aquinas notes about the possession of property, “And to take possession of something absolutely is proper both to human beings and to other animals. And so the right we call natural in the first way is common to us and to other animals. And the common right of peoples is distinct from the right called natural in the above sense, because as the Jurist says, ‘The latter right is common to all animals, the former only to other human beings.’” Further, he concludes that “since natural reason dictates things belonging to the common right of peoples (e.g., things having approximate equality), such things do not need any particular institution.” In Question 58, Article 1, Thomas notes that “justice is the habit whereby one with a constant and perpetual will renders to others what is due them.” Justice, he later concludes, “concerns our relations to others.” To that end, with the establishment of justice as being equitable in relationship with another, I turn to Karen Lebacqz.

In citing Sissela Bok, Lebacqz[4] argues that “the one against who power is used as the more accurate perspective on the situation.” For her, power goes with justice in ethical concern. She mentions that Scripture leads us to the idea that “justice includes both correcting imbalances in power and addressing the effects of imbalances in power.” The idea of that perspective matters may not have fit Thomas’ view, however, if justice is for him an equitable situation, then perspective must be taken into account. If Laws are used to inflict injustice, or an inequitable situation, upon even one, especially if that one, or a group of ones, does not inflict harm upon the society as a whole, then the law must be considered unjust. If laws create a “relationship of inherent inequality”, as the example of the physician and patient (130), then laws must be changed in order to remove this condition, as much as possible, or it is quite possible that the common good will never be achieved.

War is the absence of justice, of law, of rights. It is what should be the last resort but often, the first diplomatic tool; at least the threat of it is, to be used in modern society. As advanced as we like to pretend we are, war and the images of war are rampant in our society via media, such as television and what are commonly called video games, as well as political discourse. We have the ‘war on’ whatever it is that some political figure wishes to engender support for by marshaling the troops. But, war is much more than a game or propaganda tool. It is involves the loss of life, liberty, and will continue, as we have seen with the acknowledgment of post-traumatic stress syndrome, long after the final shot is fired to provide society with psychological ailments which will always affect the common good. Although Aquinas could not foresee the advent of the age of nuclear weapons or even weapons which are controlled by soldiers sitting thousands of miles away, his rules for warfare[5] or important to discuss today and perhaps the more so exactly for those things which he did not foresee[6].

Aquinas’ first requirement for war is that the ruler “at whose command the war is to be waged have the lawful authority to do so.” This doesn’t translate well in our current society for several reasons. Notably, the President of the United States does not have the ability to declare war, although in recent decades, that has not stopped the President from deploying troops to engage in hostilities. Congress, at least according to the Constitution of the United States, has the sole authority to declare war, but the President is commander in chief. Further, there are the issues of alliances to consider. These foreign entanglements in which most modern nations are engaged in present a crisis when war is declared. Alliances which dictate that one nation will, in the event of war, support another nation militarily if called upon to do so, prevents the first requirement of Aquinas’ Just War Theory from being carried out. Simply, when the United States went to war with Iraq, the United Kingdom was obligated to support her ally militarily. The Prime Minister had no choice but to support military intervention alongside the United States. Alliances negate the “legitimate authority to undertake war” as it allows one person to force another person into war. Second, Thomas writes that “there needs to be a just cause to wage war, namely, that the enemy deserves to have war waged against it because of some wrong it has inflicted.” Here, Augustine is quoted to give weight to this statement. For Augustine, war is just if it, simply put, restores justice which Aquinas would have understood as equitable relations. Third, those who are to wage this war must have the proper intention, “namely, an intention to promote good or avoid evil.” This final rule, Thomas notes, is the lynchpin because the intention is what matters even if the other two qualifications are met. Finally, in a reply to an objection raised, Aquinas writes, “Not all military exercises by human beings are forbidden. Rather, only disordered and dangerous military exercises that give rise to slayings and plunderings are forbidden.” In regards to killing the innocent, Aquinas concludes that “it is never lawful to kill an innocent person.”

The issue of private property is one which invokes the most discussion, I think, in regards to the common good. As a matter of fact, I suspect that in mentioning the concept of “property” and “common good” in general conversation, one may be labeled a socialist at best and a communist at worst, especially since as a whole, our population is unaware of the meaning behind the four concepts. However, Thomas saw property as relating to the common good[7]. If one holds in her mind that the external goods, property, is received from God, then Aquinas seems to have no issue with dominion of external goods. As a matter of fact, it is part of human nature to have property. As a matter of fact, private property is a good thing in the eyes of Aquinas for several reasons. First, the person who owns property is more likely to carefully manage his or her own property than that which is held in common. Second, it presents order when one knows who manages what. Third, private property leads to peace. Common ownership leads to hostilities. Attached to these three reasons is the notion of use. Here, it becomes necessary to incorporate some form of common ownership so that those who are in need can be cared for when private property is shared for that end. Aquinas calls it a sin if the rich “indiscriminately prevent others from using the property.” So, we see in Aquinas an ethic which permits private property but which calls for the use of private property for the common good.

What of an enforcement of using private property for the common good. In a situation of disparity, I would suggest that Thomas would allow for such a thing. First, let me admit that Thomas writes, “the dispensing of one’s own goods is committed to each individual, so that each may out of them assist those in need.” However, he also writes that “the natural law requires that superfluous things in one’s possession be used for the sustenance of the poor.” Previously, he notes that “it is not theft for someone to take the goods of another, whether secretly or openly, in execution of a court order, since a judge has authorized the former to take the goods.” Therefore, we see that luxury demands that one manages his or her own goods to provide for those in need, but that this management is required to focus on the needs which can be met, allowing that not all luxuries can fit all needs. Furthermore, while theft and robbery are sins in Thomas’ eyes, it is not a theft if property is alleviated by some official action. Finally, we must agree with Aquinas in saying, “one may lawfully alleviate one’s necessity with the goods of another.” However, the safeguards of justice must be observed so that when the public authority uses force to alleviate goods, it does so with the proper moderation and intention of supplying necessities to the needful.

While Aquinas notes that profit can be made, it is still against the common good to sell items for more than their inherent worth. He also takes a stand against charging interest, although the laws which govern such things are to be respected and maintained. Regarding the amassing of wealth, Thomas notes that “evil necessarily results by having more or less than that measure.” Good, and I would say the common good, is when equity is established and moderation ensues. He notes that wealth can only be amassed by the taking of goods from another.  This is contrary to justice and thus the common good. “Justice, properly speaking, establishes the measure to be observed as a matter of legal obligation in acquiring and retaining riches, namely, that human beings should not take or keep the property of another.” Justice then is based on moderation in the amassing of wealth. We might go so far as to say that an oligarchical system of wealth creates injustice and thereby disrupts the goal of the common good so much so that either laws become meaningless because they will only be promulgated over the whole by the few, or then, in response, become burdensome in redistribution of property and thereby overstep the bounds of proper alleviation of goods for the needy.

I have laid the ground work sufficiently to now turn my attention to exploring how these ethics may fit into a discussion of ethical dilemmas today. The first one is not on the morality of homosexuality, but on the rights and protections of homosexuals in a democratic society. Fr. James Keenan notes that Thomas “asserts that the goodness of the will comes from the object alone… Is not the end also a source of goodness?” Further, “the specification of these object is as right or wrong… will equally be established by the relation to reason.[8]” (70-72)  Daniel Westberg notes that Thomas does in fact view that there are actions which are always wrong, and comes “very close” that certain sexual actions are always wrong including “incest, rape, masturbation, homosexual relations, and bestiality.[9]” In Summa Contra Gentiles, Aquinas, who is blissfully unaware of the 21st century concept of human sexuality, notes that when generation cannot follow, then the emission of semen is “contrary to the good for man.” Thomas goes on to note that generation is part of the natural good because it concerns the preservation of the species, so that to preclude generation is second to homicide. While Thomas would have seen homosexual actions as a sin, and gave it strong words, he continuously based his argumentation on reason. As I have shown above, Laws are based on Reason as discovered by demonstrative sciences. Thus, we continue.

The preservation of the species is no longer an issue considering that we have reached a human population of over seven billion people. In Thomas’ day, the infant mortality rate was low enough to consider the other-than-generation semen emission as a basis to prevent, through laws, anything contrary to the generation of a person. Further, we now know that human sexuality is not reduced to the actions of an individual but is a part of them, and perhaps, if not genetically, then it is entailed in such things as brain chemistry. If brain chemistry is considered part of the nature of a person, then the person’s natural good must be preserved by laws which seek to promote the common good. Furthermore, considering that sexual intercourse is a regular component of human life, and the absence thereof to the point of isolation has been deemed psychologically harmful by demonstrative sciences, I would contend that laws meant to prevent homosexual actions are unjust. Aquinas saw justice, in part, as creating an equitable situation. If a society which prevents one act but allows other acts which are similar enough seeks to call itself just, then it is deluding itself. By virtue of the idea that justice concerns relationships among people, then to prohibit homosexual acts between two consenting adults in privacy is to deny them justice, because the same prohibitions are not in effect for other private exchanges. Demonstrative science, including biblical criticism, has led us to a new understanding of homosexual acts both in Scripture and in Humanity. These things must give way to new Reasoning, and must call for new Laws which are ordered to a new common, which includes homosexuals, good. Only by doing justice to those who have no power can we hope to be liberated from structures which have oppressed all.

The United States is engaged with an open war in Iraq and Afghanistan along with seemingly cold wars with Pakistan and now Iran. Over the recent months, the relations with Iran which haven’t been hopeful since the 1970’s have taken a decidedly downhill turn. Iran is, according to reports, has engaged in building nuclear power plants and is mere moments away from building nuclear weapons. While the United States is out of danger, an ally, Israel is not, and it is suspect that Iran has plans of waging war on the U.S. via Israel with the non-existent nuclear weapons at some point, perhaps, in the future. At present, the U.S. and other Western nations are imposing sanctions on Iran which is a form of warfare. Unfortunately, as in all war, the sanctions will only hurt those who can little afford daily substance anyway. As Alex J. Bellamy notes, the idea that the sanctions may inflict harm upon the innocent is something which Aquinas would have opposed[10]. He also notes that this Aquinas prohibition was an expansion on previous laws and traditions involving war and non-combatants. Shadia B. Drury counters Bellamy with the point that innocent for Aquinas may in fact not be the innocent we understand today[11]. Drury notes that Aquinas had no issue with believers waging war with unbelievers. At this point, perhaps Aquinas would have supported an attack on Iran, not to mention Israel, if this was indeed a holy war to convert the hordes of Muslims, and Jews, to the Christian faith, but it is not.

A pre-emptive war with Iran does not meet the qualifications of Aquinas’ Just War doctrine, for several reasons. First, if the United States is forced into war because an ally declares war on Iran, then the commander has not chosen to declare war but was coerced into it. Second, Iran has not actually built nor launched nuclear weapons, not to mention has not launched attacks on Israel or the United States of any kind which has caused loss of life. Third, the intent of an attack would be to limit Iran from developing nuclear capability. If justice is an equitable situation, then if Iran is prevented from obtaining them, then Israel should surrender its weapons especially since it has already show evidence of preemptively attacking other nations, such as Iraq, when it felt threatened. Further, one must consider that the turn of Iran back to the hard right, undoing many of the moderations it advanced in the decade before 2005 and the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who consequently was the only Iranian presidential candidate to run against the United States in his campaign, happened only after it was surrounded by pro-Israeli Western powers with Afghanistan to the north and Iraq to the south.

The Occupy Wall Street movement, which has spread to other cities and towns, began over the summer randomly as a student movement. It soon gained a worldwide following with days of action seeing massive demonstrations taking place around the globe to showcase the voice of the needy and oppressed. Their main charge, at the beginning, was that wealth was unfairly being amass into the hands of the few, the 1%, and that they, the 99%, were disgruntled enough and wanted change. They stand to challenge the corporations “which place profit over people, self-interest over justice, and oppression over equality, run our governments.[12]” Along with the laundry list of complains, they complain about the massive power which corporations have in creating laws, buying and selling, as well as the products which are being sold beyond their actual worth. Further, they charge the corporations with restricting human rights, education, and the court system. In effect, corporations have created laws which render equality useless. Wealth, for the 1%, is not being distributed so as to raise the ships for those who are sinking on the tide of economic collapse. In recent weeks, there has been a turn in speech by some pundits in questioning whether or not the 1% are actually job creators. As journalists dig into the facts of the case, the numbers become startling[13].

It would be difficult for Aquinas to imagine the amount of wealth which a Middle Class American family has, or the luxuries which the family shares, but it would be irreconcilable to him, I believe, to try to negotiate with him the numbers of the top 400 wealthiest Americans along with the disparity which the bottom percentile enjoys. However, I believe that he would side with the motivation of the Occupy crowd, although I am unsure as if I would see him with a protest sign. What would his course of action be? Aquinas would return to the notion of equity in laws, so we begin there. There is a notion that everyone should pay their fair share. Aquinas would agree, but I believe that given his notion of superfluity in goods, he would urge a tax increase on the wealthiest of the society in order to first ease the burden of those who can hardly afford it, and second, seeing as how our society views money now as a means of production, a tax increase would be useful for a reallocation of funds to help distribute the means of production so that jobs could be created and the common good could be sought[14].  Further, I think that Aquinas would upbraid those who have amassed so much wealth and it would be nearly impossible for one person, or even a generation after him, to spend it on necessities. Finally, I think that Aquinas would demand that a system of laws be established which prevent such fortunes from being amassed.

Thomas Aquinas could not have imagined the secular world in the way which we live. For him, the secular powers were still Christian and thus, subject to the teachings of the Church. Our secular society is a pluralistic society divorced from, it seems, morality altogether. Neither could he have foreseen the development of psychology along with other sciences which have proved or at least given question to ancient beliefs and moral norms. The idea of nuclear weapons and wars fought from the safety of one’s home would have given him pause. Further, the great fortunes which sit only on spreadsheets tallied by others would have, I think, perhaps destroyed his faith in humanity. But, he has given us a legacy which has not been truly grasped in this paper. My intent was not to do so, but to use his ethical structure, as far as possible, to determine the path forward to three issues which are causing no small disconcertion to the society which surrounds me. His viewpoints are solidly theological and even if we were too blind ourselves to this fact, substituting a concept such as “corporate morality” for God, it is nevertheless useless, for all law is derivate of divine law; all justice is derivate of divine justice. Yet, even in a secular world, he has something for us to live by, especially for those of us who do not live without a public acceptable of the deity.

Thomas was attempting to infuse Christian theology with the philosophy of Aristotle. He would not, I believe, be content with leaving his own synthesis unchallenged, or perhaps, unsynthesized. To that end, I think that we can recover Thomas for our use. He argues for Reason based on demonstrative sciences. This is not so much a purely Christian based apologetic, and as fact, some Christian refuse to base anything on Reason, as it is a commonality among Thomas and even modern science. Reason, then, should dictate our laws, and within reason, influence our theological acceptance of what science is showing us. Further, it should guide our foreign policy, and as much as possible, limit us in our alliances. Morality should be tied to this, and while the prohibition on the slaughter of the innocents may have been meant only for Christians, we must consider our own secularization and thus expand, just as Thomas did Augustine’s Just War Theory, the notion of what an innocent is. Finally, I believe that we can take almost wholesale Thomas’ views on private property and the use of that property as something for the benefit of the common good. In the end, Thomas is not just a Christian thinker any more than Aristotle was just a Greek philosopher. We are part of their inheritances, whether through Locke or Jefferson or some other twist and turn, and as such, it may be time to return back to the sources to figure out how to go forward once more.

 


[1] I use this particular terminology because it is doubtful that Thomas would have understood sexuality in the way which we do. As I will explain later, Thomas was focused, seemingly, on the proper function of the part of the body which would not have defined a person.

[2] J. Philip Wogaman, “The Thomistic Synthesis” (in Christian Ethics), 82-95.

[3] Question 96, Article 1

[4] Karen Lebacqz, Professional Ethics: Power and Paradox, 9-12, 124-165

[5] The following quotations will come from ST II-II, Question 40 and Question 64

[6] To note, the U.S. Air Force is no longer teaching a Just War Theory class (http://www.faith1090.com/2011/08/air-force-suspends-%E2%80%9Cjust-war-theory%E2%80%9D/ Accessed 12/12/11)

[7] The following quotations on property will come from ST II-II Questions 66, 77, 78, and 118

[8] Keenan, James, Goodness and Rightness in Thomas Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae. Georgetown University Press (1992)

[9] Pope, Stephen J (ed), The Ethics of Aquinas. Georgetown University Press (June 6, 2002)

[10] Bellamy, Alex J., Just Wars: From Cicero to Iraq, Polity; 1st edition, (2006) 40

[11] Drury, Shadia B, Aquinas and Modernity: The Lost Promise of Natural Law, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers (2008), 67

[13] In recent weeks, it has been reported that a 2007 reports shows that the six heirs Sam Walton of Wal-Mart fame, have a total net worth which is equal to the total net worth of the bottom 30% of American families combined. Further, the top 400 wealthiest Americans have a total net worth of the bottom 50% of American families. See: http://thinkprogress.org/economy/2011/12/09/385941/walmart-heirs-worth-30-percent-bottom/ (Accessed 12/12/11)

[14] I note that the encyclical of Pope Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum, and the encyclical of Pope Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno, makes extensive use of the writings of Thomas Aquinas on private property and that both are used to as the intellectual and moral foundation of distributism in Catholic social thought as advocated by such greats as G.K. Chesterton and Hilaire Belloc.

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October 17th, 2011

Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas – The Good Life

So this is a classwork assignment. Rough draft. Blah blah blah. I didn’t want to put in what I really thought about Augustine, so, you know, I called him a book end

____

Augustine and Thomas Aquinas serve as bookends to the period in Western history known as the Dark Ages, but they share something in common before their Christian faith; they both discovered the use of Aristotle in forming the Christian mind. All saw in humanity a purpose, albeit differently. Beginning with Aristotle, we find that the ancient Greek master believed that humans had a purpose, and that that purpose was for the good. While Augustine and Aquinas may have called it heaven or the blessed life[1], for Aristotle, this good life was eudaimonia. To this goal, all human actions must aim beginning with his intellect, reason and rationality. It is little wonder why this appealed so strongly later to Christian theologians, as for Aristotle, the logos was Reason, the mind of the human.

Aristotle writes, “[T]he good for man is an activity of the soul in accordance with virtue, or if there are more kinds of virtue than one, in accordance with the best and most perfect kind (Ethics, 1.7).” This energeia, or activity, would have encompassed the complete person, including the mind, so that the virtue which leads to the good life is not just an activity, or an action, of the body, but the very cognitive processes which directed that action. Thus, the good life is almost teleological in that it sees the result against the action, but continues to focus on the individual, in that virtue may be cultivated to produce the desired result, the good life. This virtue, then, is the complete human, and it was unique to our species. Of course, even within the uniqueness of humanity, Aristotle divided out women, slaves and others who could not by their own inclination choose to do virtue. By the negative, the good life is that much more accomplished when one chooses virtue, something only those who were free to do so could do. One accomplished the good life when they used the logos, or rationality, which is the purpose of humanity.

Augustine, writing during a time of social change, and writing through a time of intense personal change, begins to use Aristotle and his notion of happiness (eudaimonia) to help shape the Christian mind in ethics. Like Aristotle, contemplation of the rational was involved in pursuing the good life. For Augustine, the intellect was the pursuit of God, and turning our will back towards him and in the direction of our love. Wogaman, in his article The Moral Vision of Saint Augustine, writes that Augustine saw that God was the source of all being and that everything in Creation was an expression of God’s will. Evil and sin, then, is the moving away from the full expression of humanity, which was corrupted in the Fall. Evil, then, is moving away from God through a misdirected love of something that isn’t God. This produces sin which is “based on a mistaken conception of what is good for us.”

Augustine writes, “Man indeed desires happiness even when he does so live as to make happiness impossible… Why this paradox, except that the happiness of man can come not from himself but only from God, and that to live according to oneself is to sin, and to sin is to lose God.” To prevent this, Augustine develops the four cardinal virtues, Prudence, Justice, Temperance, and Fortitude. Like Aristotle before him, these virtues are dependent upon the soul ruling the body (XIX.25, City of God). Both agree that virtue can be an exercise, as I suspect Augustine had tried throughout his Christian life. He would allow, however, that the good life could not be completely achieved in life, “For this reason there is no perfect peace so long as command is exercised over the vicious propensities, because the battle is fraught with peril while those vices that resist are being reduced to submission.” I suspect, then, that this is why the virtues were ordered in the way that they were by Augustine, especially in preventing “bodily delights.”

Aquinas arrived at a time of scholastic renewal. As Wogaman notes, “the intellectual quickening of the late Middle Ages may have reflected more the felt need to reach beyond a complacency that had become tinged with corruption.” Thus, the thinkers of this time began to turn to the ancient Greeks, via the Arabic scholarship of the time, and reexamine theological principles. Aquinas, like Augustine before him, found Aristotle, but did so with an Augustinian tint. From Aristotle, he received the notion of the human teleos, or goal. Everything was to be considered within this light, but the end of humanity is God. For Aquinas, the good life is not happiness in activity, but in the actual realization of the event. Or rather, the desired goodness of Aristotle is Aquinas’ desired contemplation of God in the eschaton much like Augustine before him. Counter Augustine, Aquinas sees evil, then, as imperfection of the teleos, not just turning away from God. Unlike Aristotle’s view, nature and things contained therein[2] also had a teleos for Aquinas which according to Wogaman, pushed together the notion of natural and super-natural.

Aquinas saw virtue against the human agency in that our rationality may be tempered through exercise which would create good morals. Unlike Aristotle, however, God acted on the rational mind to bring about good habits, affording us a divine teleos. If God is acting upon our rational mind, then we are being pushed to the ultimate end. To this, Aquinas adopted Augustine’s four virtues, albeit with a different understanding and emphasis. Prudence is first because it is the virtue most comporting with Reason. From Prudence springs Justice, Temperance and Fortitude. Adding to this are the three theological virtues of faith, hope and love. The former are “developed through human action” (Wogaman) while the latter comes from God, pushing us to our perfect, and thus non-evil, teleos in God.

Augustine and Aquinas found in Aristotle a way to combat the irrationality of the depraved human experience, and sought to use him as a means to order the Christian ethical existence to achieve more fully the good life. Each of them saw Reason and Rationality as central to achieving the good life and happiness, but they also realized that perfection (sinlessness or non-evil) was impossible in this life. For Augustine and Aquinas, the Reason sanctified by God would be the key to make it possible, albeit only after this life. Ordering a life to these principles requires one to start first with the Reason sanctified by God. Augustine was right, that it was a certain lowliness of mind which will bring the mind up, as an exalted mind doesn’t leave room for God. One must be prepared not to be perfect, to exercise the Reason to morality, and finally, to exercise the mind.



[1] Augustine, City of God XIX.11: “It follows that we could say of peace, as we have said of eternal life, that it is the final fulfillment of all our goods.”

[2] For Aquinas, “human beings are both biological and spiritual” which allowed for a varity of teleosi to develop which accorded themselves to the empirical world.

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September 23rd, 2011

Thoughts on Thomas Aquinas and Ethics

The Glory of St. Thomas Aquinas, detail. Paris...

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So, I am still recovering and feel brain-clogged. Excuse the mess:

__

My friend Thomas never ceases to amaze me. While I may disagree slightly with him over a few things, over all, he is someone whom I love to read. I think that there is much to be said in reexamining doctrines, dogmas and other intellectual foundations from time to time to see if there is a correction needed, or even to arouse the spirit of competition so that we do not become complacent. That arousal produces thinkers such as Thomas.

One thing first – I am still not liking this idea of habits of virtue. What worries me is that this is the way we see a fix to criminality as well, but more especially so, those who we deem as moral abominations. Can you make a habit out of sexuality, to conform to the ‘natural?’ What if sometimes, we are just ‘born that way’ and if we engage in habits to transform that, we do more harm than good to the individual? Granted, I’m not saying to dismiss sin, in however we define that term and to whatever actions we attach it too, (as we do have additional principles) should be dismissed, but I am worried that we have let ourselves believe that we can just practice being virtuous or sinless and believe that this is good for our humanity. To this end, I agree more completely with his four virtues than with Augustine, as well as the addition of the theological virtues is somehow reassuring that I can still read Aristotle and not be counted a heretic (not that I’m worried about that too much).

I like Thomas’ notion of the telos of humanity, and what constitutes evil. If our End is to be good, perfect, eternal, and that End is established by God, how can we then exist eternally without that End? Of course, this may suppose a discussion on the sovereignty of God, something not found in our reading materials. I do note that he considers “ultimate happiness consists in the contemplation of truth.” The discussion author notes that Thomas also believed that “ultimate happiness is there not possible in this life.” I think back, then, to Augustine and the idea that all creatures seek peace, just sometimes, not the right peace. I still cannot come to an agreement that our telos, our peace, evil, etc… can exist outside of God, so that even the perversion is ordained by God who has established our perfect telos. If our ultimate happiness is God, and God will destroy all evil – which are not people themselves, but “imperfection of being,” then to what end is the developed notion of eternal torment, if when evil is destroyed, imperfections cease, and we realize our telos? If God’s Grace is, and I tend to agree here, “a perfecting of our created nature as a means toward our supernatural end”, then how cannot God’s Grace be extended, impartially?

In reading Thomas, I see the beginning of the Modern State – although we are starting to forget what that is – and rejoice in his words. I agree, nearly completely. I still have an issue with his formulation of Just War, however. I do appreciate the fact that he sees laws of the Modern State necessary, but that they should be limited to “chiefly those that are injurious to others.”

Sorry for the brevity, but something has placed me under the weather.

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November 20th, 2010

A few sites and words on Thomas Aquinas

The Glory of St. Thomas Aquinas, detail. Paris...
Image via Wikipedia

This week, we were studying Thomas Aquinas. Like everyone with access to the internet, I used it. Thought I might share a very interesting sight which I though summarized Thomas well,

In the orthodox view, Christianity does not have a monopoly on truth. While Christianity provides the only entirely correct account of the universe, Christianity’s perfect truth does not entail the total falsity of all other accounts, and though they are necessarily false insofar as they contradict Christianity, truth can be found in other religions and philosophies. For this reason, reconciliation with other systems has characterized the Church from its beginnings. Christianity’s engagement with non-Christian thought proceeds from the Christian belief that reason and faith are complementary, not oppositional. Thomas Aquinas’ synthesis of Aristotle and Christianity is a vital chapter in this engagement. His interaction with the philosophy of Aristotle demonstrates both the harmony of reason and faith and the oneness of truth, which are both central to the Christian intellectual tradition.

Dartmouth Apologia.

And this one:

Thomas Aquinas is often called the greatest philosopher and theologian of the late middle ages. While Augustine baptized Plato and wedded what is valuable in Platonism to Christianity, Aquinas can be thought to have done the same thing with Aristotle. Stylistically, this shows itself by Aquinas’s use of the term “the Philosopher”-for Aquinas the philosopher is Aristotle. Aquinas’s adaptations of Aristotle were considered bold and modern in the thirteenth century. Aristotelianism was gaining wide influence as the best scientific understanding then available of the world, but it seemed to many to be incompatible with Christianity. Aquinas was convinced that the on-going intellectual health of Christianity required engagement with the cutting edge of intellectual inquiry. (In this, he was indebted to Augustine.) Moreover, he was convinced that many truths about reality are available through the correct exercise of natural human reason. For Aquinas, Aristotle’s philosophy contained much that was correct.

Which you can read the rest here.

And, don’t forget Michael Barber‘s blog posts on the theologian as well…

I don’t like the platonic notions found in some Christian circles, but…. Aristotle…. It worked, you know, and I believe that Aquinas can provide Christians with the same reasonable discourse in our dealings with the modern individual today.

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October 13th, 2010

Review: God, Science, Sex, Gender – An Interdisciplinary Approach to Christian Ethics

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While I have a long review, you have read most of it, so I am including the new material first, with the older review sections following:

In the conclusion, written by Aana Marie Vigen, questions still remain unanswered; however, what Vigen does is to neatly summarize what the symposium was about as well as leave the door open for the reader (or, originally, audience) to navigate the waters to reach his or her own conclusion. Admittedly, these questions on gender and sexuality are tough to grapple with, especially by those who have a personal experience with them; however, there is enough information to help those who feel that this is the next big question in Christianity.

My main contention throughout this book is the failure to rely upon Scripture as the starting point, although several essays focus squarely  on several verses. There is not a scriptural theologian among the original speakers turned writers, and while this doesn’t seem to be an issue with the Symposium or the information provided, for those who are used to reaching for Holy Writ to tackle tough questions, it may be a little off-putting.

Vigen does make a good point when she writes that Christianity is not about a static existence, but continues to ask the question of ‘Who ought I to be‘? (p241). Many of the essays in this book point to that question without providing clear answers. This is the preferred method of discussion, or should be, when entering into this type of discourse. It is not easy grappling with modern science or ethics concerning issues which people still blush when speaking about. Unfortunately, Vigen defines ethics and lists the sources of Christian ethics only after the topics are discussed at length. Some of these sections in Vigen’s conclusions should be placed at the front of the book.

Over all, Christians are struggling to come to terms with situations in which we simply have no clear answer from Holy Writ. For an example – while we might agree that homosexuality is a sin, the bible doesn’t cover the issue of intersexuality, in which the outsides do not match either the insides or the genetic level, producing for all intents and purposes an outward appearance of, for example, female, where genetically, and internally, the person is male. Simply put, looks are deceiving, and yet, we can only cast our Scriptural net based on looks. Several of these essays go into discussing these issues at length.

This book is not about condoning any type of behavior, as at least one essay deals expressly with the modern notion that if it is the animal kingdom, than some how, it is a trait easily conceived of in humanity. Instead, most authors uplift humanity above that of the animal kingdom and call special attention to our ability to love and create super-structures in society, something beyond that of evolutionary science. And in regarding evolutionary science, Darwin is hardly accepted as sacred, but at times, is placed at odds with theology and other sciences. The sciences covered in this book are not simply evolutionary, but so too literay, natural and other interdisciplinary approaches, including biblical translation experts.

It will be difficult for the conservative Christian to wade through some of these essays; however, the issues presented here will not naturally, nor spiritually, cease to exist tomorrow. It would be preferable to read and to listen to the voices which oppose most conservative Christianity, whether it is literalism or papal infallibility issues among Catholics, than to shut our hears and forget that there are issues not fully explored in Scared Text. I believe that this book, and the authors therein, provide more questions than we are used to answering, but in the end, they will draw us closer to the truth, whether or not that truth is one in which they or we lose our own.

_____

In what is bound to elicit heated arguments from all sides of the debate, the editors have compiled a series of essays, all connected to each other, delivered in symposium style concerning the ongoing debate in (mainly) the Catholic Church about the roll in which science should play in determining human sexuality ethics. I said Catholic because while this book has at the purpose ‘Christian’ ethics, it is generally written to that of the Catholic ethicist by prominent Catholic ethicists. This is not to say that others should not read and draw from the discussions, but the role of authority may be expressed and defined differently based on the denomination.

The book contains three parts, with the first part comprised of five essays essentially laying the ground work for discussion to come. Beginning with Jon Nilson‘s historical critique on authority in the Catholic Church in which Nilson doesn’t rely upon Tradition, but attempts to correct perceived notions of Papal infallibility and hierarchy. While the history of Papal infallibility may not be known to many, what is even more unknown is the deciding factor in which many of the Cardinals had already vacated the See to return home, leaving the vote easily cast in favor of the sitting Pope’s view. Further, Nilson goes into the loosening of the hierarchical rolls leading upon to Vatican II and what should have emerged from that Council. Detected in his language, is the acceptance of the present system but only as far as history would allow. For him, this insistence into monarchical authority in Rome must be challenged by courageous theologians because,

(F)irst, to remind us all that the whole Church is not yet of one mind on issues of sexuality and, no less important, to give heart to those who have been marginalized in the Church for their sexuality and/or gender who have suffered greatly on account of it.

Nilson’s view on authority is not based in Rome, but in changing trends, a view in which he meets with resistance by Anne E. Figert‘s essay on the disputes between scientific and religious authority.

She brings to bear her sociological background in helping to show several weaknesses in surrendering to the weight of Science that which may in fact be contained in the realm of Religion, especially when both hemispheres tend to be absolute only in public. She deals with Weber and Dawkins, discussing the roll in which Religion figures as an Authority and compares it to the Authority of Science, and rightly notes that challenges to both are ‘more driven by human politics, economics, and power struggles than their claims to the pure pursuit of the truth might suggest.’ Figert describes the current boundary disputes, and just what roll Science plays in the hearts and minds of followers. This is important, especially since she notes a report by Gilbert and Mulkay in 1984 in which it was found that scientists have a different discourse in private. They are much less absolute and often times presented as competent. Figert’s essay serves to remind us of the boundary disputes and that in both areas, human politics are a driving force.

Following this is Fred Kniss who admits that framing the debate on human sexuality in the way it has been has already ‘almost necessarily pitted itself against science.’ Admitting that conflicts, such as the one discussed, are social issues but still sees the need to rely upon Science. In a brief, but powerfully open-ended essay, Kniss never comes fully to determining ‘natural’ and which sphere of authority should decide it, but does present a solid overview of the impacts of the controversy into the arenas of our lives. In what should be a common chapter in most political science text book, Kniss shows the almost hypocritical political and religious spheres in which the individual as moral project is weighed against the locus of authority.

In the final two essays of the first part, Francis J. Catania and Patricia Beattie Jung bring into the discussion Thomas Aquinas (and by virtue, Aristotle). Both present a saintly picture of Aquinas as the example for allowing Science to share, in part, in the realm of Religious Authority, at least when it comes to dictating ethics based on observable fact. Dealing with the subject of ‘human flourishing’ and the changing notion of sexual morality inside the Roman Catholic Church, each author separately builds the case the science has and could benefit theological and ethical discussions. There is, without a doubt, a large change which has taken place in the teachings on sexuality by Rome within the past century, even before Vatican II. Both authors trace this, somewhat, to Thomas Aquinas, and indeed, the ancient writer has seen a resurgence in Catholicism lately, and indeed, Christian scholasticism. How far they could bring him, however, is yet to be determined.

Why? Because while the interdisciplinary approach works well, no one has laid the foundation for ‘natural,’ ‘nature,’ and who decided what is ‘natural’ is still morally, theologically, and ethically ‘good.’ While discussing gender roles, the role in which sexual intimacy plays in marriage, and the current role and future of celibacy, we find historical changes, opposition, and flat out refusal to abide by Roman attitudes to such for the past two millennia (even in Rome herself) but these discussions present a stark difference to the current one on homosexuality. While the others have been, at sometimes, heated, homosexuality and the question of ‘if it is natural, is it divinely sanctioned’ is volatile.

The essays are well written, well supported, and provide a great companion to the discussion on-going in many theological realms.

The second series of essays, classified under the heading of Reflecting on Human Sexual Diversity, provide a series of entries from evolutionary biologists who disagree with Darwin on sexual selection and one who does not disagree. This series also includes theologians grappling with recent Vatican documents giving theological treatments to them as well as important Scriptural texts used to justify the differentiation of genders. The strength of this series, so far, has been the diversity in approaches, mixing not only disciplines but also trying to have a parallel discussion with science and religion without making one bow to the other.

The first two essays, the first by Joan Roughgarden and the second by Terry Grande and Joel Brown (with Robin Colburn), are complimentary to one another with both challenging traditional Darwinist understandings of sexuality in nature. Far from the usual role applied to procreation by Darwinist science, such as sexual selection for the security of the species, Roughgarden postulates that more often in nature than not, sexual selection is made more for social infrastructure, providing for intimate bonds which prevent the dissolution of society. For Roughgarden, homosexuality then ‘is not against nature, it is an adaptive part of nature.’ (103). Here theories are hardly met with applause by the majority of evolutionary scientists who still follow Darwin’s thoughts on sexual selection in nature. Grande and Brown take Roughgarden’s hypothesis and further it by suggesting that humanity, especially sexuality, may be evolving because we are ‘now operating in environments and social circumstances for which they neither evolved nor were adapted in a Darwinian sense.’ (p106). It is, they rightly postulate, an environment (culture, society, etc…) that we have manufactured for ourselves, which has disconnected us from what has gone before. Of course, neither focus on the history of homosexuality and sexual uses in previous societies but they are approaching it from a scientific angle and in the end both determine that science must stand as a counter to ‘Christian traditions’ in their claim of ‘timeless and ordained model(se) of human sexual behavior.’ (p121).

The essays written by Pamela L. Caughie (“Passing” and Identity: A Literary Perspective on Gender and Sexual Diversity) and James Calcagno ( Monogamy and Sexual diversity in Primate: Can Evolutionary Biology Contribute to Christian Sexual Ethics?) are two of the most rewarding of the series, especially from a non-theological standpoint. Caughie delves deep into the making of the person, whether male or female, with social contributions. Using Michael Foucault‘s work with Herculine Barbin as well as the example of Virgina Wolfe, Caughie draws the implications of the ideal of a male and female only gender network, noting that there are medical examples to the contrary and they aren’t new. Further, while her stances hardly contribute to the theological understandings of such things, she encourages her audience to read past the rhetoric of gender ‘to the meaningful content beneath’ (p152) of the person. But using examples of literature which reflect ‘real life’ I believe that more should take note of her point.

Calcagno, in the tenth essay, writes, much to the chagrin of Roughgarden, I am sure, in support of Darwin’s natural selection theories. All the while noting the diverse sexual practices in primates and their social connections. He throws some heavy questions at both sides in the debate in noting that monogamy is not natural, but rather the perverse norm in most mammals, numbering about 3%. Of course, in the 900 human cultures survived by Murdock, only 16% of them were considered monogamous (p163). He also notes that the more financial independent the genders are, the less likely monogamy is in the culture. He cautions, at the end of his essay, about the use of the animal kingdom to set human ethics (pg164), noting that of all the mammals, humans have the capacity to love, to be faithful, and to be unselfish (p163, citing Fuentes). By far and large, it is clearly the most theological of the scientific essays, in that it sets human above the animal kingdom and focuses the discussion on not what can be excused, but what should be striven for – the ideal.

The remaining two essays in this section deal expressly with theological interaction which developed Roman Catholic discussions. John McCarthy writes on Interpreting the Theology of Creation: Binary Gender in Catholic Thought while Robert Di Vito writes on “In God’s Image” and “Male and Female”: How a Little Punctuation Might Have Helped. While McCarthy writes from the spectrum of the theologian, Di Vito employs biblical studies as well as the linguistic study of Hebrew to stand against the usual Catholic, and in many times, over-arching Christian theological treatment of Genesis 1.27. McCarthy urges that the theology of creation be used in such a way as to make the ‘love your neighbor’ infused with Creation. For him, ‘becoming a neighbor is, theological, participation in the love of God that makes a person.’ (p137). For McCarthy, the ‘other’ becomes a person to be loved inside of the theology of Creation. Di Vito almost takes issued with the theological only position such as McCarthy’s and Pope John Paul II’s encyclical Mulieris dignitatem.

In his essay, Di Vito takes aim at the usual interpretation and thus theological understanding of Genesis 1, insisting instead that it be read in such a way that it produces unity of humanity at first. By doing so, he would hearken back to ancient philosophers, but allow as will the Wisdom Christology by later authors, and help to further the conversation on Galatians 3.26-28. His essay is one which is heightened by his ‘discovery’, providing not only insight into the New Creation, but He in whom we have this New Creation. I cannot say more about his essay without giving away the centrality of the argument, but it is one which must be developed later and used in the egalitarian and complimentarian debates which so many are having today.

Regarding gender issues, Di Vito stands as the most enlightening essay while in the arena of sexual diversity, Calcagno comes the closest to providing for Christian ethics in the discussion, all the while supposing that he is only a scientist.

The final section, Sexual Diversity and Christian Moral Theology, attempts to draw together theological reflection from the preceding essays, concluding with a commentary on the Ethiopian Eunuch as well as a conclusion which neatly summarizes the discussion thus far. With the breakthroughs in the second section, the third section especially Fennell’s contribution, seemed to be the back end of the peak, but that is, perhaps, purposed.

Stephen J. Pope‘s essay takes Roughgarden, Grande and other contributors plays them off one another while engaging the sexual ethics espoused by Pope John Paul II while attempting to force the interaction between the late pontiff and Feminist Catholic theologian, Margaret Farley, who he considers as standing ‘within the Catholic Christian tradition’ but ‘represents a signification modification of it.’ They are posed in opposition to one another, but their arguments are developed in such a way as to give merit and flesh to each one of their points. Reading the essay seems to be a give and take between Farley and the late pontiff in such a way, as if the reader was in the room with the two. Pope focuses on love as the Christian ethic missing from these debates and once again returns to the what McCarthy pointed out, that sexuality and gender, the consummate ‘other’, as a means to render hospitality.

The only essay to not fit into the book is Frank Fennell‘s work on Hopkins’s “Pied Beauty.” While fellow professor of literature, Pamela L. Caughie’s essay contributed to the overall understanding of how ‘the clothes make the man’ mentality, Fennell’s take is simply to focus on a poem, which concerns diversity, but adds nothing that I can see to the ultimate conservation. This is not the case for Susan Ross’ essay about the diversity of views when one ‘tweaks’ the image of Christ on the Cross. This is an essay which must be read to be enjoyed, and may be a subject of later reflection by myself, but in it, Ross tackles the “Bridgegroom-Bride” theological metaphor in recent Roman Catholic theology, seemingly ignoring the history of such a metaphor, even pre-Christian history. Her’s is not merely about depictions of that metaphor in art, or even the Crucifixion in art, but the idea that if certain things were reversed in the audience’s mind, they bring about a startling shift in attitudes about women. She gives the example of the art piece of ‘Christa’ a feminine portrayal of Christ which brought about immediate emotional responses from her students. It is an essay not for the weak, but for those wishing to encounter the idea of gender and theology, especially in dealing with ordained clergy or the all-male priesthood.

Roughgarden returns to the work along with an editor of the series, Patricia Beattie Jung, to pen a commentary of sorts on Acts 8, trying to force the story of the Eunuch into a gender-bending tale of early Christian gender-fluidity. In attempting to ‘retrieve’ for their discussion Acts 8, they fall into the trap so many have before, of making the Scriptures match up to their viewpoints as well as demanding that Scripture answers to science. Very little attention is paid to actual biblical studies, instead jumping off cliffs where other authors only looked over. The highlight of the essay is the solidly packed reinterpretation of patristics in which they bring in both old and new arguments that gender roles inside the early Church were not as strict as many have them now, although I think they go just far enough in some areas to raise a  few eyebrows.

In the conclusion, Aana Marie Vigen, begins by defining Christians ethics as something profound -

Christian social ethics, is never content merely with asking “Who am I?” It always addresses the question of: “Who ought I be?”

Going on, she ask, in relation to the community “Who are we and who ought we to become?” These questions shape Vigen’s conclusion as well as provide an overarching synopsis of the essay’s.

September 22nd, 2010

Matthew Levering – Aquinas Lecture

Thanks to Michael Barber for this -

While it may be my perspective, I do think that Thomas Aquinas is making a rather significant come back in today’s theological discussions.

August 23rd, 2010

Interaction: God, Science, Sex, Gender – An Interdisciplinary Approach to Christian Ethics (2)

Click to Order

This will be a continuing dialogue as I read through this book. (Part 1)

The second series of essays, classified under the heading of Reflecting on Human Sexual Diversity, provide a series of entries from evolutionary biologists who disagree with Darwin on sexual selection and one who does not disagree. This series also includes theologians grappling with recent Vatican documents giving theological treatments to them as well as important Scriptural texts used to justify the differentiation of genders. The strength of this series, so far, has been the diversity in approaches, mixing not only disciplines but also trying to have a parallel discussion with science and religion without making one bow to the other.

The first two essays, the first by Joan Roughgarden and the second by Terry Grande and Joel Brown (with Robin Colburn), are complimentary to one another with both challenging traditional Darwinist understandings of sexuality in nature. Far from the usual role applied to procreation by Darwinist science, such as sexual selection for the security of the species, Roughgarden postulates that more often in nature than not, sexual selection is made more for social infrastructure, providing for intimate bonds which prevent the dissolution of society. For Roughgarden, homosexuality then ‘is not against nature, it is an adaptive part of nature.’ (103). Here theories are hardly met with applause by the majority of evolutionary scientists who still follow Darwin’s thoughts on sexual selection in nature. Grande and Brown take Roughgarden’s hypothesis and further it by suggesting that humanity, especially sexuality, may be evolving because we are ‘now operating in environments and social circumstances for which they neither evolved nor were adapted in a Darwinian sense.’ (p106). It is, they rightly postulate, an environment (culture, society, etc…) that we have manufactured for ourselves, which has disconnected us from what has gone before. Of course, neither focus on the history of homosexuality and sexual uses in previous societies but they are approaching it from a scientific angle and in the end both determine that science must stand as a counter to ‘Christian traditions’ in their claim of ‘timeless and ordained model(se) of human sexual behavior.’ (p121).

The essays written by Pamela L. Caughie (“Passing” and Identity: A Literary Perspective on Gender and Sexual Diversity) and James Calcagno ( Monogamy and Sexual diversity in Primate: Can Evolutionary Biology Contribute to Christian Sexual Ethics?) are two of the most rewarding of the series, especially from a non-theological standpoint. Caughie delves deep into the making of the person, whether male or female, with social contributions. Using Michael Foucault‘s work with Herculine Barbin as well as the example of Virgina Wolfe, Caughie draws the implications of the ideal of a male and female only gender network, noting that there are medical examples to the contrary and they aren’t new. Further, while her stances hardly contribute to the theological understandings of such things, she encourages her audience to read past the rhetoric of gender ‘to the meaningful content beneath’ (p152) of the person. But using examples of literature which reflect ‘real life’ I believe that more should take note of her point.

Calcagno, in the tenth essay, writes, much to the chagrin of Roughgarden, I am sure, in support of Darwin’s natural selection theories. All the while noting the diverse sexual practices in primates and their social connections. He throws some heavy questions at both sides in the debate in noting that monogamy is not natural, but rather the perverse norm in most mammals, numbering about 3%. Of course, in the 900 human cultures survived by Murdock, only 16% of them were considered monogamous (p163). He also notes that the more financial independent the genders are, the less likely monogamy is in the culture. He cautions, at the end of his essay, about the use of the animal kingdom to set human ethics (pg164), noting that of all the mammals, humans have the capacity to love, to be faithful, and to be unselfish (p163, citing Fuentes). By far and large, it is clearly the most theological of the scientific essays, in that it sets human above the animal kingdom and focuses the discussion on not what can be excused, but what should be striven for – the ideal.

The remaining two essays in this section deal expressly with theological interaction which developed Roman Catholic discussions. John McCarthy writes on Interpreting the Theology of Creation: Binary Gender in Catholic Thought while Robert Di Vito writes on “In God’s Image” and “Male and Female”: How a Little Punctuation Might Have Helped. While McCarthy writes from the spectrum of the theologian, Di Vito employs biblical studies as well as the linguistic study of Hebrew to stand against the usual Catholic, and in many times, over-arching Christian theological treatment of Genesis 1.27. McCarthy urges that the theology of creation be used in such a way as to make the ‘love your neighbor’ infused with Creation. For him, ‘becoming a neighbor is, theological, participation in the love of God that makes a person.’ (p137). For McCarthy, the ‘other’ becomes a person to be loved inside of the theology of Creation. Di Vito almost takes issued with the theological only position such as McCarthy’s and Pope John Paul II’s encyclical Mulieris dignitatem.

In his essay, Di Vito takes aim at the usual interpretation and thus theological understanding of Genesis 1, insisting instead that it be read in such a way that it produces unity of humanity at first. By doing so, he would hearken back to ancient philosophers, but allow as will the Wisdom Christology by later authors, and help to further the conversation on Galatians 3.26-28. His essay is one which is heightened by his ‘discovery’, providing not only insight into the New Creation, but He in whom we have this New Creation. I cannot say more about his essay without giving away the centrality of the argument, but it is one which must be developed later and used in the egalitarian and complimentarian debates which so many are having today.

Regarding gender issues, Di Vito stands as the most enlightening essay while in the arena of sexual diversity, Calcagno comes the closest to providing for Christian ethics in the discussion, all the while supposing that he is only a scientist.

August 21st, 2010

In the Mail – IVP’s Awesome Service edition

I recently discovered the Confessing Church movement which is alive in many of the mainstream denominations, and as part of that movement, is the return to the early Church…. and myself, I’ve spent the last few years reading various and wonderful works by early Church writers, and have found in them, beauty. Intervaristy Press, coincidentally, has several series which brings the early writers to the modern Protestants… This past week, for review, Adrianna Wright sent along three books of great interest -

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This last volume of the Ancient Christian Commentary on Scripture offers commentary from the early church fathers on the deuterocanonical books of the Bible, with insights that will be of great benefit to preachers and teachers alike. Readers will find some ancient authors translated into English here for the first time. Throughout they will gain insight and encouragement in the life of faith as seen through ancient pastoral eyes.

Personally, I am looking forward to digging into this book as I have great interest in the Deuterocanon/Apocrypha. Already, just flipping through, the set up is the like the Ancient Christian Doctrine series which explored the Creed of 381. It simply presents the original author in their own words, without commentary to that passage. This entire series is one which should be in church and theological libraries.

Also in the mail was the Incomplete Commentary on  Matthew, volumes 1 and 2.:

In the translator’s introduction to this volume, James Kellerman relates the following story:

As Thomas Aquinas was approaching Paris, a fellow traveler pointed out the lovely buildings gracing that city. Aquinas was impressed, to be sure, but he sighed and stated that he would rather have the complete Incomplete Commentary on Matthew than to be mayor of Paris itself.

Thomas’s affection for the work attests its great popularity during the Middle Ages, despite its significant missing parts–everything beyond the end of Matthew 25, with further gaps of Matthew 8:11–10:15 and 13:14–18:35. Despite the gaps what remains is quite lengthy, so much so that we offer the work in two volumes, comprising fifty-four homilies. While the early fifth-century author displays a few Arian propensities in a handful of passages, for the most part the commentary is moral in nature and therefore orthodox and generic. The unknown author, who for several centuries was thought to be John Chrysostom, follows the allegorizing method of the Alexandrians, but not by overlooking the literal meaning. His passion, above all, is to set forth the meaning of Matthew’s Gospel for his readers.

Here for the first time this ancient work is made available in English, ably translated by James A. Kellerman and edited by Thomas C. Oden.

Thomas Oden, by the way, is a Confessing Methodist who is focused on paleo-orthodoxy.

Speaking of IVP, be sure to check out the book club which they now offer (see the icon on the right hand side of the page). I am member of it and would recommend it above other book clubs for solid Christian books.

Oh, and the awesome service? The early writers, theologians and wrestlers of Scripture and History must not be overlooked or forgotten. IVP is doing a remarkable job of bring these people to new light in the modern age.

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August 10th, 2010

Interaction: God, Science, Sex, Gender – An Interdisciplinary Approach to Christian Ethics (1)

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This will be a continuing dialogue as I read through this book.

In what is bound to elicit heated arguments from all sides of the debate, the editors have compiled a series of essays, all connected to each other, delivered in symposium style concerning the ongoing debate in (mainly) the Catholic Church about the roll in which science should play in determining human sexuality ethics. I said Catholic because while this book has at the purpose ‘Christian’ ethics, it is generally written to that of the Catholic ethicist by prominent Catholic ethicists. This is not to say that others should not read and draw from the discussions, but the role of authority may be expressed and defined differently based on the denomination.

The book contains three parts, with the first part comprised of five essays essentially laying the ground work for discussion to come. Beginning with Jon Nilson‘s historical critique on authority in the Catholic Church in which Nilson doesn’t rely upon Tradition, but attempts to correct perceived notions of Papal infallibility and hierarchy. While the history of Papal infallibility may not be known to many, what is even more unknown is the deciding factor in which many of the Cardinals had already vacated the See to return home, leaving the vote easily cast in favor of the sitting Pope’s view. Further, Nilson goes into the loosening of the hierarchical rolls leading upon to Vatican II and what should have emerged from that Council. Detected in his language, is the acceptance of the present system but only as far as history would allow. For him, this insistence into monarchical authority in Rome must be challenged by courageous theologians because,

(F)irst, to remind us all that the whole Church is not yet of one mind on issues of sexuality and, no less important, to give heart to those who have been marginalized in the Church for their sexuality and/or gender who have suffered greatly on account of it.

Nilson’s view on authority is not based in Rome, but in changing trends, a view in which he meets with resistance by Anne E. Figert‘s essay on the disputes between scientific and religious authority.

She brings to bear her sociological background in helping to show several weaknesses in surrendering to the weight of Science that which may in fact be contained in the realm of Religion, especially when both hemispheres tend to be absolute only in public. She deals with Weber and Dawkins, discussing the roll in which Religion figures as an Authority and compares it to the Authority of Science, and rightly notes that challenges to both are ‘more driven by human politics, economics, and power struggles than their claims to the pure pursuit of the truth might suggest.’ Figert describes the current boundary disputes, and just what roll Science plays in the hearts and minds of followers. This is important, especially since she notes a report by Gilbert and Mulkay in 1984 in which it was found that scientists have a different discourse in private. They are much less absolute and often times presented as competent. Figert’s essay serves to remind us of the boundary disputes and that in both areas, human politics are a driving force.

Following this is Fred Kniss who admits that framing the debate on human sexuality in the way it has been has already ‘almost necessarily pitted itself against science.’ Admitting that conflicts, such as the one discussed, are social issues but still sees the need to rely upon Science. In a brief, but powerfully open-ended essay, Kniss never comes fully to determining ‘natural’ and which sphere of authority should decide it, but does present a solid overview of the impacts of the controversy into the arenas of our lives. In what should be a common chapter in most political science text book, Kniss shows the almost hypocritical political and religious spheres in which the individual as moral project is weighed against the locus of authority.

In the final two essays of the first part, Francis J. Catania and Patricia Beattie Jung bring into the discussion Thomas Aquinas (and by virtue, Aristotle). Both present a saintly picture of Aquinas as the example for allowing Science to share, in part, in the realm of Religious Authority, at least when it comes to dictating ethics based on observable fact. Dealing with the subject of ‘human flourishing’ and the changing notion of sexual morality inside the Roman Catholic Church, each author separately builds the case the science has and could benefit theological and ethical discussions. There is, without a doubt, a large change which has taken place in the teachings on sexuality by Rome within the past century, even before Vatican II. Both authors trace this, somewhat, to Thomas Aquinas, and indeed, the ancient writer has seen a resurgence in Catholicism lately, and indeed, Christian scholasticism. How far they could bring him, however, is yet to be determined.

Why? Because while the interdisciplinary approach works well, no one has laid the foundation for ‘natural,’ ‘nature,’ and who decided what is ‘natural’ is still morally, theologically, and ethically ‘good.’ While discussing gender roles, the role in which sexual intimacy plays in marriage, and the current role and future of celibacy, we find historical changes, opposition, and flat out refusal to abide by Roman attitudes to such for the past two millennia (even in Rome herself) but these discussions present a stark difference to the current one on homosexuality. While the others have been, at sometimes, heated, homosexuality and the question of ‘if it is natural, is it divinely sanctioned’ is volatile.

The essays are well written, well supported, and provide a great companion to the discussion on-going in many theological realms.