Unsettled Christianity

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March 14th, 2012

How Ethics Can Help You Have a Better Sex Life | Psychology Today

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As an ethicist I often talk about human conduct and decision-making using the vocabulary of virtue. Generosity, courage, patience and determination are examples of virtues. Thinking about virtues is useful whether any particular one of us ever perfectly exemplifies them. The point is to move toward a closer approximation. Aiming at a virtue is like having an ambitious goal for the amount of weight we will be bench pressing by next year for strength conditioning. Even if we don’t get all the way there, we become stronger in the process.

How Ethics Can Help You Have a Better Sex Life | Psychology Today.

Ethical love-making? Surely not…

But…

She does have a point.

January 30th, 2012

Reading the Bible for All the Wrong Reasons: Chapters 5-7

Click to OrderReading the Bible for All the Wrong Reasons by Russell Pregeant

Here’s the conclusion of my look at Reading the Bible for All the Wrong Reasons. (See Part One here)

Neither Rigid Rules nor Billy Club: The Nature of Biblical Ethics

How do we understand “the rules” of the Bible and how has the Bible’s rules been used to beat people over the head? To emphasize his point, Pregeant tells the story of a woman who suffered years of abuse and was told by he pastor to stay with her husband. Why? Because the Bible demanded it. And yes, this kind of Bible abuse continues today.

The Bible and Our Beliefs: Reflections on Christian Doctrine

Here Pregeant takes a look at traditional theology as well as some other branches of theology (open and process theology are referenced, although not named directly). Pregeant discusses God’s power, knowledge, and the problem of evil.

Life in the Spirit: The Gospel of Grace and Demand

How do we live in the world and not fall into the trap of idolatry? How do we live out the gospel of grace? These are the topics that Pregeant discusses in this final chapter. The answer for Pregeant is love: love of the other.

I think it’s a safe bet to say Pregeant and I are close theologically, so it should come as no surprise that I liked this book. I think this book is a great resource for anyone just starting to question their understanding of the Bible as Pregeant is very careful to provide options, not absolute answers. Pick it up and give it a read. It’s not that thick and is a relatively easy read.

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January 13th, 2012

Review: Addiction and Virtue: Beyond the Models of Disease and Choice @ivpress

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A book which looks at addiction theologically? Isn’t addiction just sin? Can’t we look at the alcoholic as a moral failure? Should we change these views?

That’s the author’s purpose, as outlined succinctly in his preface. Why? Because from the start, he argues that the Church may in fact be complicit “in the production of a culture of addiction (p10).” So, then, why shouldn’t the Church talk about it? He suggests that “addiction cannot be adequately appraised until addiction is understood as a misguided enactment of our quest for right relationship with God (p11).” With the discussion of habits and the apartness from God, one should already begin to recognize the use of Aristotle and Aquinas in Dunnington’s work, something he notes as possibly off putting to some readers. It shouldn’t be, considering the foundation which they have given Christian theology and reasoning. His thesis is simple: (T)here is something philosophically and theologically profound about addiction but that standard and entrenched paradigms must be recast or overthrown in order to bring what is at stake into stark relief (p12).” With the course laid out, with a respecification of addiction, we begin the book.

Reason and Action are two things which philosophers struggle to define. It is also something that is worth discussing when speaking about addiction as either a habit or a disease. This first chapter is somewhat technical in the medical and philosophical sense, but worth it as the author is able to poke holes into the disease terminology applied, and as he shows, illogically, to addiction. By the end of it, after he has unsettled the notion that people must be genetically predisposed to addiction, he begins to move to where I have seen him heading before, in using Aristotle’s notion of virtue by enforced habit. There is also, and it shouldn’t be inescapable, but the matter of voluntarism and determination present and this is how chapter two begins.  To be honest, this is where I struggled the most with this book, not to mention my Ethics class in seminary. The two seem so far apart, but Dunnington suggests that it is a false dichotomy, and like some before him, turn to the theory of habit. His points here are made, easily enough. He supposes that we are indeed hypocrites in the way we treat addicts. We call it a disease and then imprison them for what is assumed to be a predisposition. Further, the disease model allows inaction by the addicts and yet, there are groups like AA which show that addicts can re-energize their will. All of this is placed in view of Aristotle with his discussion on agency and habits. As the reader moves into the next two chapters, she should begin to question the miraculous healings of addiction and what it actually means to be addicted. Dunnington takes us through the arguments that addicts aren’t immoral, depraved, individuals, but those who, like us, are seeking the good life. After laying the groundwork, Dunnington moves to tackle Addiction according to certain tenants of Christianity. He includes sin, worship and the Church. These chapters set the praxis of the author’s thesis.

The summation of the book may not always be found in neat reviews; instead, the summation of this book is hope. While my addictions are not as prevalent as the visible condition of a drug user or alcohol user, I have those types of addictions in my family for several generations, and outside what is considered immediate. This book helps to shed light, to perhaps understand them better. They aren’t merely abusive, to themselves and others, depraved people without hope and sense or morality; they are children of God, albeit with a misplaced sense of good. This is where Aristotle and Aquinas come in, where Jung and others come in. Dunnington is able to show that in many ways, addiction has already been covered by a great portion of Christian scholastic theology, that of habit, morality and virtue. Once we get to the root of the matter, and step away from the actions of themselves, we can begin to observe the psychology of addiction and see that often times, the models that we have developed to help us explain away people in spiritual need may instead serve to be corrected by looking backwards to great minds, minds themselves addicted to pursuing the good life. Dunnington shows that we should begin to look at people with unhealthy addictions much like the way we do with ourselves.

This latter idea is where the chapter on worship makes the most profound impact of the entire book, I think. He writes, “Thus, within the Christian worldview, if addiction is conflated with dependence, there is no way to avoid the charge that devotion to God is an addiction. (172)” What if addiction to drugs, alcohol and other forms of risky behavior takes the place of worship? The theologian Dunnington begins to craft a picture that like idol worshipers, addicted people have misplaced the infinite long for God with a happiness that is more proximate. It is as if the academic no longer thinks, but has settled instead on the last piece of information attained which was unknown before. There is no upward movement for people with addictions, because they have settled for what brings them happiness and order for the moment. It is at this point that one must begin to consider, as we might with other worshipers, that these alcoholics and drug users aren’t any less human than we are, but indeed, more. They know about order and happiness, albeit their order and happiness is only a false form. It is in this notion of false and true worship, false and the real good life, that the Church must begin to fulfill her directive. If we view addiction as more of a sin of idolatry then our theological approach to these sisters and brothers will broaden, I suspect.

I wrestled with this book; it is not easy to not condemn addicts or to think that the hurts in our past were caused by the same behaviors which propel us to God. Dunnington humanizes them and calls for the Church to respond as we would to others who haven’t stepped off the path to the good life. This book is the beginning of a return to using theology to examine the world and using the habit of Christian virtue to bring about restoration.

As a final note… this is not a complaint, but a reader not familiar with Aristotelian and Aquinan ethics may have some difficulty in fully grasping, early on, what the author means by a few of his concepts, such as good life. 

October 15th, 2011

Short Essay on the Three Categories of Ethics

This is an assignment due today. Thought I’d post it. Rip it to shreds, my friends:

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Deontological ethics are those ethics based upon rules which have various sources such as Divine Command, Natural Law, Covenant and Rules, and Covenants and Contracts. The name of these ethics is derived from the Greek word deon which simply means something necessary. Thus, we should understand that deontological ethics are those rules which are seen as necessary for one reason or another, such as identity forming or because they are the will of God. They are seen as an obligation for the rule followers because it binds them to the rule-maker, which in some cases may be God or one another in a society. These ethics have a weakness in that they often produce rules which prevent good or better actions. Lovin gives the example of a Church steward who in following the letter of the law, is unable to make the local congregation more money on its investment. Or, following the Trolley Problem as introduced by Philippa Foot[1], actions are declared wrong regardless if by committing one ‘sin’ (or breaking one rule) better actions result. The results matter little in this genre of ethics, only the morality of the action. In the end, it simply doesn’t allow the individual or society to seek results, only to follow the rules[2].

In teleological ethics regards the “good” as an object of the goal. (Lovin, 22) As Lovin points out, the development of these ethics comes to fruition in the developments of the late 18th and early 18th century democracies. Simply put, it was the ethics of what causes the most happiness to those interested. It allowed societies to question antiquated rules and establish new norms to reflect the new sense of human destiny. These ethics involve achieving a goal, but as Lovin points out, the goals are often difficult to find. Others have noted that this idea of communal happiness has its drawbacks in that often times, rights or long standing rules which are meant to preserve order can be dispensed with because the communal happiness is in question[3].  Bentham is incorrect when he notes that our interests outpace our fears. Both drive one another, and in a teleological society, they can be driven against the minority[4]. Further, as Lovin seems to note, teleological ethics seems to multiply our consumerism in that the objects are multiplied. However, I also note that Lovin notes the positive aspect of teleological ethics, “(T)he principle of community suggest that we should choose those goals that enrich the lives of other people and enable them to live good lives of their own (31).” Perhaps in a teleological ethics of that principle, one can focus on the more positive interests and put their fears at bay.

Virtue ethics are based on the individual and their agency. Unlike the previous two, it is more individualistic and seems to be more situational. On these virtues, Lovin writes, “Virtues are the admirable qualities of persons that emerge from an examination of their narratives and that shape their moral lives (63).” Further, Lovin notes Aristotle who believes that virtue can be learned (64) and then writes that the rules which the individuals have learned have become inseparable from their personas (65). The focus then is not on rules or goals, but on the person themselves, so that once the person is a well-defined virtuous being, they would be expected to take part fully in either a deontological or teleological society. These particular set of ethics deal with individuality morality, which Lovin is able to connect several times to the Christian narrative (for example, 67, in which Lovin connects the Sermon on the Mount as a set of virtues) and to theological virtues. As Augustine, Aquinas and Lovin have noted, the essential moral virtues can be categorized as: temperance, courage, prudence, and justice (68). Of course, the weakness here is that virtues differ from culture to culture, and from time to time, something Lovin notes as well (67). A strength, however, is that these set of ethics seem to be able to be cultivated.

The weakness of the various categories of ethics are easily seen. Deontological ethics doesn’t allow to the result to be factors into the decision making process. It begins with the morality of the action, taken in the abstract, and forces one to align their actions in the concrete with the rule. In teleological ethics, while a good result is the desired goal, it refuses to allow the goal to be easily defined. Happiness for the community may be seen differently by the individuals. Further, with no concrete goal, the need to constantly expand the concept of happiness appears, giving a consumerism view to the community. In virtue ethics, the individual is in view, with the determined goal to make him or her a moral creature; however, the weakness here is that virtue is defined by the time and place of the individual. The strengths then, reverse the trend of moving further away and rejoin the three categories.

In virtue ethics, the morality of the individual is cultivated to produce a rational and reasonable creature who fits into the teleos of the society at large. If gives individuality to the society, in that the individual is the building block of a society. The teleos can now be said to rest on group-morality rather than individualistic pursuits. The moral creature is, in society, given a collective goal and purpose beyond commodity production. It is, then, the pursuit of life, liberty and happiness which the society is centered on. Once the individual is cultivated to be moral, and the teleos is declared to be right, then the deontological rules developed will serve as a social contract which protects the individual while maintaining the pursuit of the society.  A society cannot start with rules and build ethics, neither give itself a purpose which is then supposed to bring about ethics, and neither can an individual exist as moral without purpose and rules.

I close with Lovin’s final words, “So the moral life, instead of being a way to defend ourselves, becomes a way to love our neighbors and a way to love God as well.” The moral life, then, is made up of rules and purpose, but the individual’s response to morality, and for the Christian, the individual’s response to God’s morality.



[1] Philippa Foot, The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect in Virtues and Vices (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978)

[2] I note in the Divine Command aspect, the example in 1st Samuel 16 should be ignored. In this passage God allows Samuel to break several rules to address the dangerous situation, which secured a better result over against the result which would have happened if Samuel had obeyed the rules.

[3] Scheffler, Samuel (Ed.) (1988). Consequentialism and Its Critics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[4] I note the Patriot Act and Lovin’s words on 25, “We would not think we had achieved the good life if the price we had to pay for material security was the surrender of control over our future or the denial of beliefs and values we hold most dear.” Further, there is the value of individualism which is surrendered in our consumeristic society.

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October 3rd, 2011

A New Theological Resource

A unique and ambitious web-based theological resource has been launched in Geneva by the World Council of Churches and Globethics.net. It aims to redress a global imbalance of access to research materials in theology and related disciplines.

The Global Digital Library on Theology and Ecumenism (GlobeTheoLib) contains several hundred thousand of articles, documents and other academic resources that can be accessed online free-of-charge by registered participants from anywhere in the world via Internet (www.globethics.net/gtl).

“The time has come to launch a new model of ecumenical sharing of theological resources in order to prepare world Christianity for the 21st century,” said the WCC General Secretary, the Rev Dr Olav Fykse Tveit.

via Major theological online resource launched | Ekklesia.

Sounds great!

September 23rd, 2011

Thoughts on Thomas Aquinas and Ethics

The Glory of St. Thomas Aquinas, detail. Paris...

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So, I am still recovering and feel brain-clogged. Excuse the mess:

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My friend Thomas never ceases to amaze me. While I may disagree slightly with him over a few things, over all, he is someone whom I love to read. I think that there is much to be said in reexamining doctrines, dogmas and other intellectual foundations from time to time to see if there is a correction needed, or even to arouse the spirit of competition so that we do not become complacent. That arousal produces thinkers such as Thomas.

One thing first – I am still not liking this idea of habits of virtue. What worries me is that this is the way we see a fix to criminality as well, but more especially so, those who we deem as moral abominations. Can you make a habit out of sexuality, to conform to the ‘natural?’ What if sometimes, we are just ‘born that way’ and if we engage in habits to transform that, we do more harm than good to the individual? Granted, I’m not saying to dismiss sin, in however we define that term and to whatever actions we attach it too, (as we do have additional principles) should be dismissed, but I am worried that we have let ourselves believe that we can just practice being virtuous or sinless and believe that this is good for our humanity. To this end, I agree more completely with his four virtues than with Augustine, as well as the addition of the theological virtues is somehow reassuring that I can still read Aristotle and not be counted a heretic (not that I’m worried about that too much).

I like Thomas’ notion of the telos of humanity, and what constitutes evil. If our End is to be good, perfect, eternal, and that End is established by God, how can we then exist eternally without that End? Of course, this may suppose a discussion on the sovereignty of God, something not found in our reading materials. I do note that he considers “ultimate happiness consists in the contemplation of truth.” The discussion author notes that Thomas also believed that “ultimate happiness is there not possible in this life.” I think back, then, to Augustine and the idea that all creatures seek peace, just sometimes, not the right peace. I still cannot come to an agreement that our telos, our peace, evil, etc… can exist outside of God, so that even the perversion is ordained by God who has established our perfect telos. If our ultimate happiness is God, and God will destroy all evil – which are not people themselves, but “imperfection of being,” then to what end is the developed notion of eternal torment, if when evil is destroyed, imperfections cease, and we realize our telos? If God’s Grace is, and I tend to agree here, “a perfecting of our created nature as a means toward our supernatural end”, then how cannot God’s Grace be extended, impartially?

In reading Thomas, I see the beginning of the Modern State – although we are starting to forget what that is – and rejoice in his words. I agree, nearly completely. I still have an issue with his formulation of Just War, however. I do appreciate the fact that he sees laws of the Modern State necessary, but that they should be limited to “chiefly those that are injurious to others.”

Sorry for the brevity, but something has placed me under the weather.

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September 22nd, 2011

Full Text of Pope Benedict XVI’s speech to the BUNDESTAG

We are studying a little bit of Natural Law in our Ethics class. I think that this might fit well into it. Also, I have to make up an excuse to post this or else Jeremy may think that I am becoming Catholic -

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Mr President of the Federal Republic,
Mr President of the Bundestag,
Madam Chancellor,
Mr President of the Bundesrat,
Ladies and Gentlemen Members of the House,

It is an honour and a joy for me to speak before this distinguished house, before the Parliament of my native Germany, that meets here as a democratically elected representation of the people, in order to work for the good of the Federal Republic of Germany. I should like to thank the President of the Bundestag both for his invitation to deliver this address and for the kind words of greeting and appreciation with which he has welcomed me. At this moment I turn to you, distinguished ladies and gentlemen, not least as your fellow-countryman who for all his life has been conscious of close links to his origins, and has followed the affairs of his native Germany with keen interest. But the invitation to give this address was extended to me as Pope, as the Bishop of Rome, who bears the highest responsibility for Catholic Christianity. In issuing this invitation you are acknowledging the role that the Holy See plays as a partner within the community of peoples and states. Setting out from this international responsibility that I hold, I should like to propose to you some thoughts on the foundations of a free state of law.

Allow me to begin my reflections on the foundations of law [Recht] with a brief story from sacred Scripture. In the First Book of the Kings, it is recounted that God invited the young King Solomon, on his accession to the throne, to make a request. What will the young ruler ask for at this important moment? Success – wealth – long life – destruction of his enemies? He chooses none of these things. Instead, he asks for a listening heart so that he may govern God’s people, and discern between good and evil (cf. 1 Kg 3:9). Through this story, the Bible wants to tell us what should ultimately matter for a politician. His fundamental criterion and the motivation for his work as a politician must not be success, and certainly not material gain. Politics must be a striving for justice, and hence it has to establish the fundamental preconditions for peace. Naturally a politician will seek success, as this is what opens up for him the possibility of effective political action. Yet success is subordinated to the criterion of justice, to the will to do what is right, and to the understanding of what is right. Success can also be seductive and thus can open up the path towards the falsification of what is right, towards the destruction of justice. “Without justice – what else is the State but a great band of robbers?”, as Saint Augustine once said . We Germans know from our own experience that these words are no empty spectre. We have seen how power became divorced from right, how power opposed right and crushed it, so that the State became an instrument for destroying right – a highly organized band of robbers, capable of threatening the whole world and driving it to the edge of the abyss. To serve right and to fight against the dominion of wrong is and remains the fundamental task of the politician. At a moment in history when man has acquired previously inconceivable power, this task takes on a particular urgency. Man can destroy the world. He can manipulate himself. He can, so to speak, make human beings and he can deny them their humanity. How do we recognize what is right? How can we discern between good and evil, between what is truly right and what may appear right? Even now, Solomon’s request remains the decisive issue facing politicians and politics today.

For most of the matters that need to be regulated by law, the support of the majority can serve as a sufficient criterion. Yet it is evident that for the fundamental issues of law, in which the dignity of man and of humanity is at stake, the majority principle is not enough: everyone in a position of responsibility must personally seek out the criteria to be followed when framing laws. In the third century, the great theologian Origen provided the following explanation for the resistance of Christians to certain legal systems: “Suppose that a man were living among the Scythians, whose laws are contrary to the divine law, and was compelled to live among them … such a man for the sake of the true law, though illegal among the Scythians, would rightly form associations with like-minded people contrary to the laws of the Scythians.”

This conviction was what motivated resistance movements to act against the Nazi regime and other totalitarian regimes, thereby doing a great service to justice and to humanity as a whole. For these people, it was indisputably evident that the law in force was actually unlawful. Yet when it comes to the decisions of a democratic politician, the question of what now corresponds to the law of truth, what is actually right and may be enacted as law, is less obvious. In terms of the underlying anthropological issues, what is right and may be given the force of law is in no way simply self-evident today. The question of how to recognize what is truly right and thus to serve justice when framing laws has never been simple, and today in view of the vast extent of our knowledge and our capacity, it has become still harder.

How do we recognize what is right? In history, systems of law have almost always been based on religion: decisions regarding what was to be lawful among men were taken with reference to the divinity. Unlike other great religions, Christianity has never proposed a revealed body of law to the State and to society, that is to say a juridical order derived from revelation. Instead, it has pointed to nature and reason as the true sources of law – and to the harmony of objective and subjective reason, which naturally presupposes that both spheres are rooted in the creative reason of God. Christian theologians thereby aligned themselves with a philosophical and juridical movement that began to take shape in the second century B.C. In the first half of that century, the social natural law developed by the Stoic philosophers came into contact with leading teachers of Roman Law. Through this encounter, the juridical culture of the West was born, which was and is of key significance for the juridical culture of mankind. This pre-Christian marriage between law and philosophy opened up the path that led via the Christian Middle Ages and the juridical developments of the Age of Enlightenment all the way to the Declaration of Human Rights and to our German Basic Law of 1949, with which our nation committed itself to “inviolable and inalienable human rights as the foundation of every human community, and of peace and justice in the world”.

For the development of law and for the development of humanity, it was highly significant that Christian theologians aligned themselves against the religious law associated with polytheism and on the side of philosophy, and that they acknowledged reason and nature in their interrelation as the universally valid source of law. This step had already been taken by Saint Paul in the Letter to the Romans, when he said: “When Gentiles who have not the Law [the Torah of Israel] do by nature what the law requires, they are a law to themselves … they show that what the law requires is written on their hearts, while their conscience also bears witness …” (Rom 2:14f.). Here we see the two fundamental concepts of nature and conscience, where conscience is nothing other than Solomon’s listening heart, reason that is open to the language of being. If this seemed to offer a clear explanation of the foundations of legislation up to the time of the Enlightenment, up to the time of the Declaration on Human Rights after the Second World War and the framing of our Basic Law, there has been a dramatic shift in the situation in the last half-century. The idea of natural law is today viewed as a specifically Catholic doctrine, not worth bringing into the discussion in a non-Catholic environment, so that one feels almost ashamed even to mention the term. Let me outline briefly how this situation arose.

Fundamentally it is because of the idea that an unbridgeable gulf exists between “is” and “ought”. An “ought” can never follow from an “is”, because the two are situated on completely different planes. The reason for this is that in the meantime, the positivist understanding of nature and reason has come to be almost universally accepted. If nature – in the words of Hans Kelsen – is viewed as “an aggregate of objective data linked together in terms of cause and effect”, then indeed no ethical indication of any kind can be derived from it. A positivist conception of nature as purely functional, in the way that the natural sciences explain it, is incapable of producing any bridge to ethics and law, but once again yields only functional answers. The same also applies to reason, according to the positivist understanding that is widely held to be the only genuinely scientific one. Anything that is not verifiable or falsifiable, according to this understanding, does not belong to the realm of reason strictly understood. Hence ethics and religion must be assigned to the subjective field, and they remain extraneous to the realm of reason in the strict sense of the word. Where positivist reason dominates the field to the exclusion of all else – and that is broadly the case in our public mindset – then the classical sources of knowledge for ethics and law are excluded. This is a dramatic situation which affects everyone, and on which a public debate is necessary. Indeed, an essential goal of this address is to issue an urgent invitation to launch one.

The positivist approach to nature and reason, the positivist world view in general, is a most important dimension of human knowledge and capacity that we may in no way dispense with. But in and of itself it is not a sufficient culture corresponding to the full breadth of the human condition. Where positivist reason considers itself the only sufficient culture and banishes all other cultural realities to the status of subcultures, it diminishes man, indeed it threatens his humanity. I say this with Europe specifically in mind, where there are concerted efforts to recognize only positivism as a common culture and a common basis for law-making, so that all the other insights and values of our culture are reduced to the level of subculture, with the result that Europe vis-à-vis other world cultures is left in a state of culturelessness and at the same time extremist and radical movements emerge to fill the vacuum. In its self-proclaimed exclusivity, the positivist reason which recognizes nothing beyond mere functionality resembles a concrete bunker with no windows, in which we ourselves provide lighting and atmospheric conditions, being no longer willing to obtain either from God’s wide world. And yet we cannot hide from ourselves the fact that even in this artificial world, we are still covertly drawing upon God’s raw materials, which we refashion into our own products. The windows must be flung open again, we must see the wide world, the sky and the earth once more and learn to make proper use of all this.

But how are we to do this? How do we find our way out into the wide world, into the big picture? How can reason rediscover its true greatness, without being sidetracked into irrationality? How can nature reassert itself in its true depth, with all its demands, with all its directives? I would like to recall one of the developments in recent political history, hoping that I will neither be misunderstood, nor provoke too many one-sided polemics. I would say that the emergence of the ecological movement in German politics since the 1970s, while it has not exactly flung open the windows, nevertheless was and continues to be a cry for fresh air which must not be ignored or pushed aside, just because too much of it is seen to be irrational. Young people had come to realize that something is wrong in our relationship with nature, that matter is not just raw material for us to shape at will, but that the earth has a dignity of its own and that we must follow its directives. In saying this, I am clearly not promoting any particular political party – nothing could be further from my mind. If something is wrong in our relationship with reality, then we must all reflect seriously on the whole situation and we are all prompted to question the very foundations of our culture. Allow me to dwell a little longer on this point. The importance of ecology is no longer disputed. We must listen to the language of nature and we must answer accordingly. Yet I would like to underline a further point that is still largely disregarded, today as in the past: there is also an ecology of man. Man too has a nature that he must respect and that he cannot manipulate at will. Man is not merely self-creating freedom. Man does not create himself. He is intellect and will, but he is also nature, and his will is rightly ordered if he listens to his nature, respects it and accepts himself for who he is, as one who did not create himself. In this way, and in no other, is true human freedom fulfilled.

Let us come back to the fundamental concepts of nature and reason, from which we set out. The great proponent of legal positivism, Kelsen, at the age of 84 – in 1965 – abandoned the dualism of “is” and “ought”. He had said that norms can only come from the will. Nature therefore could only contain norms if a will had put them there. But this would presuppose a Creator God, whose will had entered into nature. “Any attempt to discuss the truth of this belief is utterly futile”, he observed. Is it really? – I find myself asking. Is it really pointless to wonder whether the objective reason that manifests itself in nature does not presuppose a creative reason, a Creator Spiritus?

At this point Europe’s cultural heritage ought to come to our assistance. The conviction that there is a Creator God is what gave rise to the idea of human rights, the idea of the equality of all people before the law, the recognition of the inviolability of human dignity in every single person and the awareness of people’s responsibility for their actions. Our cultural memory is shaped by these rational insights. To ignore it or dismiss it as a thing of the past would be to dismember our culture totally and to rob it of its completeness. The culture of Europe arose from the encounter between Jerusalem, Athens and Rome – from the encounter between Israel’s monotheism, the philosophical reason of the Greeks and Roman law. This three-way encounter has shaped the inner identity of Europe. In the awareness of man’s responsibility before God and in the acknowledgment of the inviolable dignity of every single human person, it has established criteria of law: it is these criteria that we are called to defend at this moment in our history.

As he assumed the mantle of office, the young King Solomon was invited to make a request. How would it be if we, the law-makers of today, were invited to make a request? What would we ask for? I think that, even today, there is ultimately nothing else we could wish for but a listening heart – the capacity to discern between good and evil, and thus to establish true law, to serve justice and peace. Thank you for your attention!

September 20th, 2011

Thoughts on Augustine’s Ethics

Louis Comfort Tiffany, Window of St. Augustine...

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For ethics class – we are given assignments to read, and I write freely – free thought, or whatever you call it:
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First thoughts? Ahhh… patriarchy, superstition and hope. But, naivety as well.  Here is a man who condemns as unpeaceful the appointment of kings, with no man given dominion over another, ideally. He knows that the Heavenly City is ‘sojourning’ in the world. And yet, he still has the father as king over the household. I note his use of demons wherein we may use other words. And, to count peace as such a thing? Naivety. I’m not sure peace is the ideal state to attain to. Of course, his naivety may be a subjective response between his present state and his former life of hedonism. Or it may be that I am too cynical to believe that peace comes from anything by certainty, and certainty has produced nothing by trouble for some. Also, I don’t like his suggested end of the wicked, but I am sure that that is more theological rather than personal. I do, however, like his notion that only in the “consummation of history” will the City of God reign freely; however, as stated above, I’m not sure we wait until it happens, passively allowing what is not-right to go on in the name of “not yet.” For hope, I think that Augustine sees an end to the warfare of this life, when we are reunited with God.

I note that he writes “the peace of the good life” when speaking about the blessedness which comes from doing God’s will. He writes that “our peace shall be so perfect and so great as to admit of neither improvement nor increase.” I tend to think that he sees the world in too much black and white. Is peace absolute perfection? But, he uses the term “eternal life” instead of “peace” when I would use “life everlasting”. I agree that it is about a certain quality “over there”. Maybe peace is not such a bad term.

He is correct, in his estimation of humanity – that we all seek some sort of peace, even if that peace is different from the “natural order”. I am not sure, though, that peace is “an ordered obedience” to God (13) as it was Christ who brought us peace with the Father, and calls us to obedience in Faith. I think that he sees Peace as the end of all conflict, but I’m not sure that this is the biblical view of peace. If Christ has brought peace, and we sin, do we undo what Christ has done? Of course, Augustine may be speaking only of the eschatological peace, but wasn’t Paul as well? I have to wonder if Augustine did not have a tortured mind, in which on some days, he came to one pole and on other, another pole, in so much to say that Augustine’s mental state is one which we might see differently today.

I really like and may even agree with his four cardinal virtues and his description of their offices, albeit with restrictions on such things as temperance. I agree that the “restraining and quieting of passions” is necessary in serving God and seeking the good life but to go as far as “scorn all bodily delights” is going beyond the mean. However, given Augustine’s background, perhaps this was his way, but hardly helpful for everyone. This is obviously something that matters to him, as he gives it a great deal of time; however, I think that temperance should be tempered by prudence instead of what appears to be an outright rejection of the good of temporal things. I have to wonder if his rejection of “theological or metaphysical dualism” contributed to this black and white view. But to this, I look at 19 which allows that only the teachings of the false teachers must change if they convert. Augustine, then, must have look at orthodoxy as a saving work unto itself.

Interesting is his view on the Devil, again perhaps influenced by this lack of dualism, and of course, a more plain sense reading of developed Christian theology. He notes that the devil is not at peace, although he was created good. “Hence not even the nature of the Devil himself is evil” and attributes the evil of the Devil to perversion. And of course, the sinner is punished for evil acts, something God didn’t create. To me, this is Augustine’s way of applying punishment, especially of the eternal sort, to the person, without affording that God may be using evil, or sin, to effect his overall plan. This idea of misdirection, as well, seems to me to be Augustine’s rationalization of evil, giving God all power, except in directing our wills. Further, there is the “falling away” aspect of the human soul which leads to sin. How is it, then, that God could allow this to happen? This, I think, leads him to obligation and God’s foreknowledge. How much of a broken heart would Augustine’s God have to be able to see a swath of humanity fall into hell and be powerless to stop it?

I detest Augustine’s advocacy of coercion on heretics, being such a one myself. I like his Just War theories, although I feel that the best use of Just War is akin to Sun Tzu. His view on wealth is not surprising and should be tempered only slightly, else we alleviate poverty as a work. I like this understanding of ‘People,’ but it leads me to question the idea of patriotism, among other unifying things. Of course, if I were to examine this understanding next to, say, the phrase “people of God,” I find that Augustine’s definition seemingly putting the unification, or the calling out there of, of persons into People on the people, removing it from God’s creation of the group. Of course, I think he is speaking more about the false notion of the Roman Commonwealth. But, if not, his last few lines in chapter 24 are sufficient to understand that God does not rule where he is not loved, and where God is not loved, injustice and a host of sins prevail.

I am afraid of tackling Augustine, because I feel that I do not fully know his influences. There is the reaction against his former life, both secular and religious, as well as the reactions to his present state, the sack of Rome. But, in that, I still find in Augustine great value and merit, and perhaps, later, I’ll come to appreciate him much more than I do now.

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September 15th, 2011

Aristotle, Virtue, Calvinism, Neuroscience, Freewill and stuff

Portrait of Aristoteles. Pentelic marble, copy...

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Doubtful that you’ll know the source, and I don’t feel like posting them at the moment. But… these are responses to readings… So, you know…

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Aristotle:

Aristotle is arguing that virtue is produced by nurture, or habituation (habits), rather than nature. I think that while the ancient philosopher is a dozen worlds removed from modern neuroscience, his truths and reality must be measured against such things. In 2007[1], a neuroscientist began an experiment that showed that a moral choice could be predicted by a scan of the brain, some seven seconds before the person made the decision. What then of Aristotle’s notion of free will? Could nature be overturned by nurture so easily? What if virtue and ethics then, or perhaps rather, the choices we make unhindered by laws, aren’t done so because of habit or something inside of us, but because of the way the brain functions? Then, wouldn’t virtue be afforded the same value which Aristotle gives to the natural senses? So that perhaps some humans are prone to be more ethical and virtuous by nature while others are left to simply be depraved? What’s left then is to continue to promote the model program of habituation in case there is a way to fight nature, that is, if Science and Calvin are wrong.

While I agree, generally, with the summation of Aristotle’s ethics, I find that in 2.14, we relate back to the decision of the action of virtue is concluded to be personal, and valid if the choices are made with good reason. I would argue that virtue, like all knowledge, is true regardless if we understand it to be so. Further, I play the anti-advocate here and surrender the position to Science. If the brain is chemically aligned to already make certain choices, then the idea of knowing, as well as having them performed in a perfect state, is removed, and the virtue becomes a Craft. If ‘doing’ is raised to the pride of place for Aristotle in virtue, then perhaps that motivation is retained, but I would again turn to the idea that in a Craft, the knowledge exists even before it is exercised. If Virtue is a craft, then it is enough that someone is pre-programmed, if you will, to be virtuous and thus the actual performance of the new craft, i.e. virtue, is counted for nothing, or rather, very little. To counter, again Aristotle, one cannot become good, or virtuous, simply by doing the actions proscribed by a habituation because if we are already slotted to do them, then they are our craft. To the effect, I am not given to grammar, but by habit, I perform the actions of a grammarian, I am still not a grammarian. I have, because of fear of ridicule, learned to curtail my natural impulses and natural craft of mutilation of words and sentence structures. I would then say, if I were to surrender to Science the position, that someone who makes the right choice out of fear of reprisal only performs the actions necessary to prevent personal enjoy, but the choice is still not made. The only real choice made is to prevent injury or to attempt to escape injury. The unvirtuous remain so, although they may from time to time look to be virtuous.

Then, I were to surrender to Science the position, virtue no longer requires habituation or practice, but remains a Craft which needs to be exercised by the virtuous. Further, it ceases to be a purely human function as we understand human function.

I do tend to agree with him, however, on what a virtue is and find it well suited to my current state of middle way, third way, or reconciliation.

Legacies of Christian Ethics:

Under Tension One I would count myself among the “many biblical scholars” whom the authors mentioned on page two, and in the back of my mind, I think of Ecclesiastes and Proverbs as well as Ruth and Ezra, but equally, I say that there is a core of unity, albeit for many it is the unity of the canon within the canon. I have one, and I’m not afraid to admit it. Although, I guess, it goes beyond the Protestant Canon. I appreciated the argument of reason v. relevation as well, and to sum up that the moral vision for Paul was Christ Crucified. This alone seems to stand against Reason and rationale thought, which was a stumbling block for many, and still is. And again, I come to the split between Reason and Revelation as the author notes that there is a way to properly use the two.

And again, under Tension Two, I find myself in disagreement about Creation, Psalm 8 and the Songs of Solomon, albeit due to private studies[2] and not Church Tradition.  So, I guess a main point here, is that a correct, better, interpretation of the materialism of Creation may help prevent the contrast between Spirit and Nature.

Agreed with everything in Tension Three.

In regards to Tension Four, I have to say that I agree with him here as well, especially with the focus on the Love of God. Tensions Five and Six are equally good. I enjoy the presentation of arguments in Scripture.

Philosophical Legacies:

I am intrigued by this notion which the author mentions, this ancient Enlightenment in which ancient minds sought to get around the myths which were causing division. Perhaps, history does repeat itself, or at the very list, mimesis is natural. Equally so, I am attracted to the notion of a universal concept of justice. I do not believe that such over-arching notions are limited to time and space (culture) which puts me in the mind of the universalism of Israel’s mission. So, I’d agree that Truth is universal. So, we have Truth and Justice as universal. (If only there was something else, so other way to attach to those two…) Plato is right, about critical thought and about the philosopher kings. Overall, though, this section is rather interesting, but only informative.



[2] Not to be confused with pulling a book of a shelf and declaring myself a scholar

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September 13th, 2011

Thoughts on Curran’s Moral Stance

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For Ethics class – reflections on Charles Curran:

In determining the starting point for morality and moral theology, the author seeks to, from his Tradition, find the “logical first step” which he identifies as stance. Stance, then, is the method in which we determine both perspective and horizon, or as the author states, reality and how it all fits together. A logical issue which I find troubling, then, is that he also states that the proof of stance is within itself.

Curran then proceeds to tackle various views of the starting point, first with James Sellers who he deems too optimistic. I might would agree that to seek wholeness in a world of brokenness, albeit one in which Christ is still bringing forth the New Creation, is too optimistic, although hopeful. Curran is further correct in dealing with James Gustafson, which doesn’t take into account the Historical Jesus, it seems. This is always of an interest, to determine how the critical study of the Historical Jesus may play a future role in the study of Christian ethics, but to base ethics completely upon a very subjective Christ is to only ask for equally subjective, and culturally sensitive, ethics and morality.

I agree with Curran when he writes, “Thus, love is a very complex reality, and Christians have found it hard to agree on the precise meaning of Christian love”, but even in that, I might not discount love as a starting point for morality. Love is a many splendored thing, to borrow an old and boring cliché, but it allows us to continuously grow. Moving on, he notes that virtue alone cannot be the starting point, stating, “substantive reality cannot encompass all other realities.” But, God is Love (1 John 4.8), and while I generally timidly run the gambit of heretic to heterodox, I am tempted to jump full into panentheism as a stance. Not to mention universal reconciliation, the ultimate Love, as a stance. What is more “broadly catholic so that it includes all reality” than a God who is Love if that same God encompasses all reality? (ex deus v ex nihilo?)

Curran then moves on to discover stance among, oddly enough, Christian doctrines as upheld historically. They are “creation, sin, incarnation, redemption, and resurrection.” For Creation, normally seen as ex nihilo, he cites the “good” aspect, but never answers the ‘good for what’ question? Further, what if Good meant ordered, as Create, for some scholars, mean to call into existence? He notes the usual interpretation of Sin and Evil which came into the world through humanity which might seem to reinforce the Adamic myth, although he leaves himself wiggle room in noting that Genesis is not really about Creation, but about the human role in sin and evil. My question, is, what of the Covenants which made out of Love? What if we started there? However, I appreciate the Roman Catholic view as expressed by the author, in that sin and evil have not completely destroyed, or perhaps deprived, the world of basic goodness. Our basic humanity survives beyond the usual charges and examples of depravity. Moving to the Incarnation, Curran is right, although a little too Traditional (i.e., not Christus Victor). For Curran, the Resurrection shows that human fulfillment “lies outside of history.” Agreed on that point as well. To this, he points to and uplifts the eschatological tension of the “already” and “not yet.” This is Curran’s stance, where perspective and horizon meet to show how all reality neatly fits together.

I appreciate the statements on Roman Catholic tradition which affirms the basic goodness of humanity and Creation, and I find similarity there with the Wesleyan Tradition.

In regarding to the section entitled, “Theological Aspect of Natural Law”, I find it based on subjective reasoning. Reflection with human reason is based in a temporal moment, often cultural and nearly always contextual. Too much reflection on human nature has led to awful things in human history. While Human Reason is indeed something to be raised to a new height, often times, it must be tempered with the divine reasoning in Scripture, else we find too much dust and not enough breathe. I disagree with this section, in that natural law, as Curran as demonstrated, has changed from time to time, with some groups arriving disastrously late to certain conclusions. Of course, much of my reaction is catalogued by Curran in his section on Protestant objections, which makes me worry about myself.

He notes that Rome has not given “enough importance to the reality of sin” which I seem to think must play a large role in using human reason or natural law to determine anything. If, as Scripture plainly tells us, sin has corrupted us, not completely, then how can we completely trust Human Reason or Natural Law to determine morality? But, I would caution anyone from focusing too much on the nature of sin, as we more often than not see it easily enough in someone else, and then using natural law, seek to correct them according to our reasoning. In later a later section, I since that sin may not be the focus, but the result of the lingering force of sin. Sin is a reality, but not the reality. I do disagree, however, with the moral theologians and about what can “influence the proper moral response.”

Further, I appreciate his ability to recognize the chastening in Karl Barth.

As with most things, I find that Vatican II has presented a wonderful working model for some of us who are rather Catholic-lite. In dealing with Scripture, Reason and Natural Law, it does an equally marvelous job of attempting to pin things back to Scripture.

Curran’s use of his stance to tackle different issues is important, because it is practical. I agree with him, and I assume the Catholic Tradition, regarding killing, Just War, and pacifism. Further, the connection between sin and death, although I suspect that I might disagree with the initial death brought out by sin. Maybe not, though.

In examining the Social Gospel through the reality of sin, I see the point about it, or rather while some have some disagreements with it. Further, I like his criticisms of Hauerwas.

Plus, his use of Wesley – Scripture, Tradition, Reason, and Experience – helps to solidify him as a rational human being. In using those things, more so than the five mysteries as presented by Curran, I believe we come closer to a better moral stance. In Scripture, I would agree with Vatican II again, I suspect, especially in regards to the mind of the author in interpreting Scripture. I agree with Curran’s handling of Tradition as well. I tend to like his unpacking, as it were, of Reason and Experience as well.

Over all, Curran presents a stance which is bound to the biblical narrative as currently understood. If morality is based upon that, my question would be to what extent would current understanding of morality be upended if the narrative changed?

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September 11th, 2011

Religion doesn’t always equal a ‘good life’

I’ve missed a lot this week, so I’m catching up. Found this picture at James’ site:

Ahhh…. ethics…